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Donald J. Kochan* 
THE MARKET TO ROAM: 
USING SHARING ECONOMY PLATFORMS 
 FOR EXPANDING ROAMING ACCESS  
TO LAND RESOURCES 
ABSTRACT 
Outdoor recreation is big business. And, the majority of 
recreationalists do not have their own property upon which to 
recreate or roam. This article proposes a framework for a market 
to roam, where technology-facilitated bargaining leads to 
transfers of roaming rights and the provision of access across 
private lands. Such a system can borrow from what we know 
about traditional land use cooperation platforms, together with 
what we are learning from the sharing economy and its use of 
technology platforms to assist with matching owners of under-
utilized resources with individuals interested in accessing or 
using those resources. The article engages with property law 
debates over the capability of the property system to support 
subdivision of rights, or sticks, in the property rights bundle. New 
sharing economy mechanisms are demonstrating just how such 
technologies can make transactions in subdivided property 
bundles more accessible to owners and users of property. 
Expanded access to interact with ecological resources while 
roaming on private lands could be obtained through strong 
exclusion rights facilitated by innovative technologies and 
organizational models that help foster greater inclusion through 
easy and accountable access rights. The article concludes that an 
exclusion rights-based market to roam is superior for achieving 
the ecological and other ends progressive property scholars seek 
when advocating for mandatory access and free roaming rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
If strangers want to roam on and through the property of others, is it a 
natural right of the roamer to do so, is it something the law should create as an 
enforceable right that supersedes an owner’s right to exclude others, or is it the 
kind of right that should be generated only after bargaining in a market-based 
exchange (like when someone rents your house)? These are the questions this 
article encounters as it examines a demand for rights to roam juxtaposed against 
varying proposals to supply it. The debate over roaming rights has so far been 
dominated by advocacy toward state-based conferral of such rights at the expense 
of property owners’ exclusion powers. This article seeks to balance that debate by 
asking whether we should instead strive toward laying the groundwork for a 
“market to roam.” Such a market would involve buying and selling access rights to 
private lands enabling what would otherwise be strangers to those lands to lawfully 
roam (i.e., hike, walk, wander, meander, or otherwise tour) across another’s land. 
Market mechanisms could develop to facilitate consensual exchanges between 
property owner-suppliers and roamer-consumers. 
Interest in recreation and recreation markets is booming and on an upward 
trend.1 According to a February 2018 U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of 
Economic Analysis report, “the outdoor recreation economy accounted for 2.0 
percent ($373.7 billion) of current-dollar GDP in 2016.2 In addition, the outdoor 
recreation economy grew 3.8 percent in 2016, compared to growth of 2.8 percent in 
the overall economy.”3 Within this industry, there is an increasingly evident 
demand for broader access to private and public lands for recreational purposes. 
This demand includes what might be called “roaming” rights or privileges that 
would allow individuals not presently entitled by ownership rights to obtain such 
rights through property rights purchases (by easement or other means), contractual 
exchange, or even through coercive mandate. 
Within a system of governance in which most ownership is defined by 
principles of private property rights, most often we are talking about boundaries 
and borders governed by principles of dominion and control.4 To the extent we talk 
 
 1. U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, News Release, Outdoor Recreation Satellite Account: 
Prototype Statistics for 2012-2016, (Feb. 14, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.bea.gov/news/2018/outdoor-
recreation-satellite-account-prototype-estimates-2012-2016 [hereinafter 2018 BEA Report]; see also 
Jodi Peterson, Latest: Outdoor Recreation Recognized as Economic Contributor, HIGH COUNTRY 
NEWS, (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/issues/50.4/latest-outdoor-recreation-recognized-as-
economic-contributor/print_view (“the federal government has recognized outdoor recreation as an 
official industry. In early February, the Commerce Department announced that outdoor rec contributed 
more than $373 billion toward the gross domestic product in 2016, about 2 percent of the total. It’s the 
first time that the GDP report included separate figures on the industry’s value.”). 
 2. 2018 BEA Report, supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Consider, for example, default common law rule of trespass: “At common law, every person’s 
land is deemed to be enclosed, and landowners have the right to exclude persons from trespassing on 
private property. Accordingly, every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, entry into the close, or 
private property, of another is a trespass at common law, which necessarily carries with it some damage 
for which the trespasser is liable.” 75 AM. JUR. 2D TRESPASS § 18 (2007); but see generally Nicholas 
Blomley, The Boundaries of Property: Complexity, Relationality, and Spatiality, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
224, 252 (2016) (arguing for a less simple understanding of property boundaries given that they must be 
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about access, we are most often speaking about gates and entry governed by default 
rules of prohibition overcome only by showings of permissions and purchase. This 
boundary-based perspective means that access to property usually starts from a 
position in which private property owners are presumptively in control. Inherent in 
that system, then, are limits to access by non-owners. In fact, the architecture of the 
system creates “a perception that public use and private ownership are in conflict 
and non-compatible.”5 Consequently, it is not surprising when our system of 
private property frustrates those who want to enjoy some of the land seemingly 
monopolized by landowners, especially when they feel like these barriers fence off 
nature itself or make publicly valuable resources inaccessible.6 The desire to 
recreate and roam without borders exists. How we reconcile that desire with 
intentional tensions of a private property system becomes part of the policy 
struggle engaged in this article. 
Of course, everything is more nuanced in a legal system than it may 
immediately seem when a debate first reveals itself. Our system has never fully 
recognized a strict dichotomy between exclusion and access in absolutes, with 
varied forms of mandated and customary access rights existing throughout the 
states. As Professor Robert Ellickson opined, property systems regularly become “a 
major battleground” on which the conflict “between individual liberty and privacy 
on the one hand and community and equality on the other” is fought.7 Nonetheless, 
as this article will detail, there has been a heavy thumb on the scale in these battles 
toward exclusion rights for private property owners. 
The manner in which we juggle interest in public access to resources and 
property rights has been an area of longstanding debate, and questions regarding 
how we achieve recreational access in particular have become increasingly present 
in these discussions. Outdoor recreation has seen such an upsurge that Professor 
Carol Rose, for example, has focused on calling it “a socializing institution” that 
“now seems to support the ‘publicness’ of some property.”8 
Those types of claims undergird the beliefs of some that the public should 
have the automatic privilege to access private lands through a mandated “right to 
roam.” Progressive property scholars, for example, increasingly discuss the “right 
to roam” as an exemplar of socially beneficial policies that do not rely on and/or 
 
understood in conjunction with their role in identifying spatiality and social relationality—i.e. 
“boundaries do not stand outside the relations that constitute them and the geographies in which they are 
situated”). 
 5. Neil D. Hamilton, Rural Lands and Rural Livelihoods: Using Land and Natural Resources to 
Revitalize Rural America, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 179, 200 (2008). 
 6. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, Comparative Perspectives on Property Right: The Right to 
Exclude, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 539, 545 (2006) [hereinafter Anderson, Comparative Perspectives] (“Many 
of us may have felt a similar frustration trying to reach some allegedly “public” resource—perhaps a 
beach or a beautiful mountain—and being confronted with a solid barrier of private property that limited 
access.”). 
 7. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1345 (1993). 
 8. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779 (1986). 
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reject the supremacy of the right to exclude.9 They argue that mandating inclusion 
is often socially optimal, including generating opportunities to access ecological 
and other land resources that would otherwise be off limits to others if strong 
private property exclusion norms were enforced.10 Why, however, must we assume 
that markets and strong exclusion norms are incapable of also generating roaming 
rights with similar beneficial effects? Professors Jonathan Klick and Gideon 
Parchomovsky have posited that “nowhere are the fault lines between [property 
exclusion essentialism advocates and progressive property theorists] clearer than in 
the context of the right to roam.”11 
Yet, as Ken Ilgunas, author of Trespassing Across America and an 
advocate for governmentally-mandated rights to roam, laments in a 2016 op-ed, 
“there has never been a mainstream conversation about [the right to roam]. There 
are a few advocates in law journals, but none have made a splash outside of their 
field.”12 Ilgunas is correct that the debate deserves more attention, but this article 
contends that the conversation also needs to widen the perspectives it invites. The 
existing discussion is limited in audience, as Ilgunas recognizes, and it is also 
limited in scope. Too often that conversation is dominated by those seeking to push 
for coercive mechanisms limiting the right to exclude in order to accomplish 
satisfaction of roaming preferences. An alternative dialogue would consider 
embracing the right to exclude as a means of facilitating inclusion-based and 
access-sensitive exchange. This article seeks to expand that conversation, 
especially by injecting more discussion about market-based approaches to 
supplying roaming opportunities. It concludes that time-tested contractual and 
property law mechanisms can be used by innovators and entrepreneurs to develop 
ways for landowners to offer access rights to consumers interested in roaming 
across their lands. Moreover, we should find ways to make the law friendly to such 
innovation, developing legal mechanisms that support and encourage such a market 
to roam. 
In Part II, this article sketches a blueprint from which legal institutions 
might launch a project of assistance that can guide a roaming market into existence. 
It posits that—whether through contract forms or property forms—a market to 
 
 9. Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L. REV. 413, 462-
65 (2017) (“Progressive property works often cite rights to roam as an example of progressive property 
in action.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An 
Empirical Assessment, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917, 921 (2017) (“the ambition of the progressive property 
movement is unabashedly normative: it calls for the furtherance of such values as civil responsibility, 
environmental stewardship, life, human flourishing, autonomy, freedom, and ‘individual and social 
well-being’” and stating that they “refer to progressive property scholars as the ‘pro-access camp.’”); 
John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 
739, 745 n.17 (2011) [hereinafter Lovett, Progressive Property] (discussing the connection land access 
brings between users and land virtues, including engagement with land’s complex “ecological and 
environmental characteristics”); see also generally Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Public Access to Private 
Land for Walking: Environmental and Individual Responsibility as Rationale for Limiting the Right to 
Exclude, 23 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 260-62 (2011). 
 11. Klick & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 921. 
 12. Ken Ilgunas, This is Our Country. Let’s Walk It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/opinion/sunday/this-is-our-country-lets-walk-it.html?_r=0. 
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roam could develop in which private property owners and roamers efficiently 
bargain for roaming rights with the aid of new technology. 
Part III describes the evidence of demand for greater access to private 
lands and explains ways in which both the markets and governmental actors have 
responded. Part IV discusses the growing body of progressive property scholarship 
that draws on the right to roam in its efforts to demonstrate the capacity of the state 
to facilitate inclusion opportunities that advance human flourishing. 
In Parts V and VI, this article challenges some of the assumptions of 
progressive property scholars and others that roaming rights can only be 
accomplished by coercive commands. The social utility from access and interaction 
with ecological resources could be obtained through strong exclusion rights 
facilitated by innovative technologies and organizational models that help foster 
greater inclusion through easy and accountable licensing. As Jonathan Adler 
explains, “Environmental problems . . . are often essentially ‘property rights 
problems’ and are best redressed by the extension, definition, and defense of 
property rights in environmental resources.”13 These Parts describe some of the 
ways that new technology is expanding opportunities for property owners to choose 
inclusion, drawing substantially on insights from the market forces driving the 
sharing economy14 and the platforms that facilitate these new categories of 
commerce. 
Part VII focuses on the legal mechanisms by which tradeable roaming 
rights might be created – principally contracts, existing property forms like 
easements and licenses, and potential new property forms. Part VII concludes that 
contracts and existing property forms should be able to do the work necessary to 
provide the legal mechanisms for roaming rights exchange. Nonetheless, even if 
new property forms would be necessary, it should not be problematic. So, while 
Part VII discusses the literature on limitations on property forms and the reasons 
for prohibiting the development of customized property interests, this literature 
leaves room for the evolution and adaptability of property forms—especially when 
new technology makes such new forms available without negative impacts on third 
party information costs and other standardization principles. When coupled with 
the understanding of the emerging technologies discussed in Part VI, there is room 
to believe that it is possible to segregate roaming rights sticks within the property 
rights bundle. 
Part VIII describes some of the operational kinks that will need to be 
worked out if a market to roam is to emerge. It discusses subjects like owner 
liability to roamers, the applicability and limitations of recreational use statutes to 
ease such concerns, the need to manage adverse possession risks, public safety 
 
 13. Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property 
Rights and Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 987, 1021 (2005) (citing Peter J. Hill & 
Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights and Externalities: Problems and Solutions, in WHO OWNS THE 
ENVIRONMENT? xi (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998)). 
 14. Although it is a concept without exact definition, the “sharing economy” can be identified 
“inclusively to mean an ‘economic model where people are creating and sharing goods, services, space 
and money with each other.’” Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 
53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 147, 150 (2016). 
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concerns, and other areas that should be on the checklist of any up and coming 
entrepreneurs who will begin to design a market to roam. 
After explaining what is possible within the law to facilitate a market to 
roam, Part IX explores some of the advantages of market-based roaming over the 
compelled access that has been the preferred means to date to accomplish roaming 
goals. It defends a market-oriented approach to achieving roaming values as 
comparatively superior to a less accountable coercive mandate that would require 
private owners to cede portions of their exclusion rights by granting permission 
rights to strangers to roam without consent or compensation. Not only does market-
based roaming increase access (including to ecological resources) without 
diminishing property rights or depriving owners of their gatekeeping powers, it also 
has the added benefit of superior monitoring and accountability measures. 
Instead of facilitating roaming by constricting exclusion rights—the result 
of most proposals to inject roaming opportunities in the United States and 
elsewhere15—this article concludes in Part X that the desired ends of roaming 
facilitation can be reached by actually embracing exclusion with its logical 
outgrowths and extensions. Discussions regarding how best to protect ecological 
resources often create “tensions between liberal values and environmental 
protection.”16 This article challenges the notion that these must be mutually 
exclusive sets of protected concerns. Because the consensus is that the United 
States is unlikely to any time soon, if ever, adopt roaming legislation like that seen 
in other countries,17 to the extent advocates wish to reach a point where greater 
inclusion for roaming is possible, they should welcome a conversation about an 
approach that achieves those ends through market forces. 
II. WHAT IS THE MARKET TO ROAM? A BRIEF SKETCH 
“Roaming” is a word that generally captures the idea of walking, hiking, 
or even wandering across land, sometimes defined as “to travel purposefully 
unhindered through a wide area” or “to go from place to place without purpose or 
direction.”18 As used in the literature on property rights, roaming access debates 
 
 15. Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 224-25 
(2011) (explaining that roaming rights in the United Kingdom and Norway are an example of a place 
where the “exclusion rights of real property owners have been contracted in various ways in response to 
changing social needs.”). 
 16. Adler, supra note 13, at 990. 
 17. Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of Sticks, 19 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 432 (2007) [hereinafter Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam] (“Short of 
a revolution in American thinking about the right to exclude, however, it is difficult to imagine serious 
modifications to the right to exclude anytime soon.”); John D. Echeverria, From a “Darkling Plain” to 
What?: The Regulatory Takings Issue in U.S. Law and Policy, 30 VT. L. REV. 969, 978 (2006) (“Great 
Britain recently adopted national legislation affirming the public’s ‘right to roam’ across unenclosed, 
rural lands. For better or for worse, such a measure would be dead on arrival constitutionally in the 
United States, at least for the foreseeable future.”); Robertson, supra note 10, at 260-62 (concluding that 
the exclusion tradition in the United States makes roaming mandates unlikely); Ilgunas, supra note 12 
(recognizing “a national right to roam law is unlikely” but, short of that, advocating for “ways that state 
governments can create better green and coastal walking spaces now.”). 
 18. Roaming, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/roam (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2018). 
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usually focus on whether individuals may do this roaming across private or public 
lands, the surface fee of which the roamer does not presently own.19 Presumably, 
“roaming” rights—whether established by private agreements or by governmental 
mandate—could be defined to include access alone (such as for hiking, walking, or 
wandering) or to also include a variety of activities as permissible once these lands 
are accessible (including camping, hunting, picking, swimming, or foraging). Most 
of the roaming access advocacy, from progressive property scholars and other 
outdoor enthusiasts, operates on perceptions of the necessity of state intervention in 
markets to bring about the availability of roaming rights. This article’s primary 
purpose is to open up discussion which challenges that presumption. Based on law 
and technology’s track record at developing and adapting to provide access to other 
things (home, apartments, cars, tools, etc. in the new sharing eceonomy), there is 
good reason to believe that the advent of new technology should make possible 
exchange of roaming “sticks” in the property rights bundle or contractual 
arrangements between willing owners and willing roamers that can expand roaming 
access without losing the valuable benefits of robust exclusion rights in our 
property system. As a launching point, it seems useful to begin this Article’s 
discussion by dedicating this part to a very brief synopsis of the project 
contemplated. In other words, this part provides a sketch of how a market to roam 
might work. 
A market to roam can best be realized by learning from and adapting the 
architecture of existing business models in the sharing economy (such as the use of 
technological platforms to connect willing owners of goods or property with those 
desiring but lacking access to goods or property, the reputational quality control 
mechanisms such platforms facilitate, and the trustworthy and customized 
contracting and exchange forms) to the roaming enterprise. Increasingly, members 
of society are becoming familiar with homesharing platforms apps like Airbnb that 
connect willing property owner hosts with willing non-owners looking for a short-
term place to stay.20 When we think of a market to roam, we can imagine platforms 
emerging that facilitate similar connections.21 Willing property owner hosts could 
supply their land, in part or whole, as available for roaming. Individuals who want 
to roam across property could seek out a platform where the willing hosts list their 
properties and where the roamers go to obtain the rights to roam across the land of 
a stranger—just as guests using Airbnb obtain the rights to sleep in the stranger’s 
bed. Much like Airbnb offers a temporary residence to a demanding public in a 
home or Uber offers a ride in a car—each involving access to assets that the 
consumer of those services could not afford or simply does not want to buy 
outright—a roaming market would allow recreationalists to obtain rights to access 
 
 19. See generally, e.g., Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17. 
 20. See generally infra Part VI. 
 21. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 106-107 (2016) (describing the 
basic features of platforms, including how platforms utilize technology (including smart phones, 
internet, algorithms, rating data, information compilation, and the like) to dramatically reduce the 
transaction costs that a Coasean model traditionally understood to be barriers to many exchanges). 
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vast amounts of land that those roamers could not afford or would not want to 
buy.22 We might call it the Uberization of trails.23 
Ultimately, though, platforms for the market to roam will undoubtedly 
generate their own unique characteristics to match the unique product to unique 
demands. For example, a roamer usually needs rights to cross more than one 
property at a time in order to have a good hike or a valuable experience, unlike the 
Airbnb or Uber customer who is likely to rent only one house or one car at a time. 
Thus, the roaming platforms may need to add in some multi-property coordination 
components. On this, perhaps the architects of roaming platforms could borrow 
features and learn lessons from platforms like Spotify24 or ASCAP,25 where 
customers buy a license to access the work of all of the artists in the platform rather 
than just one at a time, thereby overcoming insurmountably high transaction costs 
of negotiating with every individual participant. Perhaps the property owners who 
agree to place their properties as available for roaming could be treated like the 
artists who allow their music to be available for streaming and where the end-user 
negotiates only with the platform as the intermediary compiler, or assembler, of the 
properties. The artists win too because they need not negotiate with each consumer, 
but instead set upon terms with the platform to compensate them based on the level 
of consumption of their art. In a roaming market, property owners might benefit by 
registering their property with a platform rather than dealing with every roamer. 
However it would be run, the essence of a market to roam is to generate 
roaming rights through consensual exchange. Individual property owners would 
opt-in to a property law and contract law governance regime that manages roaming 
rights and transfers rather than have their exclusion rights limited through 
requirements to allow strangers to stomp through their land. 
Property owners or the platforms that manage their rights could offer 
roaming for free or at a price. Individual roamers could purchase general licenses 
that work with all participating property owners or could purchase individual 
licenses that might be triggered by some geo-tag alert that would be received on a 
smartphone or other mobile electronic device when the roamer hits a boundary. 
When a roamer is pinged that they are entering into a new property, they might be 
 
 22. Id. at 110 (explaining that for many products it is cheaper to buy access than to buy the 
product). 
 23. Id. at 89 (describing how platforms create the possibility of “the Uberization of everything.”). 
 24. What is Spotify, SPOTIFY, https://support.spotify.com/is/using_spotify/the_basics/what-is-
spotify/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (describing Spotify as “a digital music, podcast, and video streaming 
service that gives you access to millions of songs and other content from artists all over the world. Basic 
functions such as playing music are totally free, but you can also choose to upgrade to Spotify Premium. 
Either way, you can: 
Choose what you want to listen to with Browse and Search. 
Get recommendations from personalized features . . . 
Build collections of music. 
See what friends, artists, and celebrities listen to. 
Create your own Radio stations.”). 
 25. About ASCAP, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/about-us (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (ASCAP 
“license[s] over 11.5 million ASCAP songs and scores to the businesses that play them publicly, then 
send[s] the money to [its] members as royalties” and it uses “cutting-edge technology to process over 
one trillion performances every year.”). 
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asked to enter into a new transaction or register their presence. Roamers might buy 
bundles or packages in advance from a platform that allows them to roam across 
multiple properties in a single trip, thereby minimizing the disruption of engaging 
in new transactions at every boundary crossing. 
Technicians could create protective features as well. If roamers could be 
tracked and monitored by having their GPS location or other information 
transmitted to owners through a signal generated on the roamer’s mobile device, 
for example, liability for damages could be more accurately traced and assessed 
with lower identification costs. If, for example, we know that roamer X was at 
location Z when a fire started there, we could identify the responsible party. We 
could create a responsible roaming regime in which roamers are required to better 
internalize the costs of their actions and be held responsible for damage to property, 
encouraging the roamers to be good stewards as they roam (and holding them 
responsible if they are not). By harnessing what we know about the sharing 
economy and the utility of platform technology, a market to roam seems 
achievable. 
III. EVIDENCE OF DEMAND, AND SOME RESPONSE WITH 
SUPPLY BY MARKETS AND BY GOVERNMENT MEANS 
Past access-based innovations can serve as models that should make us 
optimistic about the feasibility of this article’s proposals. We should develop a 
framework for a system for licensing or otherwise granting roaming rights that will 
borrow from what we can learn from these traditional land use cooperation 
platforms. We can also learn from the sharing economy and its use of technology 
platforms, discussed later, to assist with matching owners of under-utilized 
resources with individuals interested in using those resources. 
A number of market and governmental moves signal the existence of 
consumer demand for more opportunities to access private property for roaming 
and other recreational purposes. If those signals are accurate, wise innovators 
should begin to find ways to generate a market-based supply of roaming rights. 
Under normal market conditions, economic theory predicts that when a demand for 
a product emerges, the supply follows. Sometimes innovation is required to figure 
out how to generate the product and satisfy the demand. Oftentimes that involves 
technical innovation. Sometimes, however, legal innovation is required as well—to 
overcome existing legal hurdles or to develop legal instruments that can clear the 
way for economic markets to create and offer the products being demanded, for 
example. In fact, the way the law reacts will often influence the shape of the market 
products available. 
Outdoor recreation is big business. And, the majority of recreationalists do 
not have their own property upon which to recreate or roam. Matching roamers 
with property that can be used to satisfy their recreational preferences is one of the 
challenges at the foundation of this article. Existing regimes for the supply of 
access rights demonstrates there is a demand. The question remains whether the 
market or government mandates should be used to satisfy that demand. There are 
emerging market-based exchange mechanisms that are already working to expand 
access opportunities. If the market starts to generate new vehicles for access 
agreements, there are likely individuals who would engage in that marketplace as 
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consumers of the roaming rights products. Still, governments, principally states, 
have also mandated rights of access, structured their laws with rebuttable 
presumptions of access rights, or initiated programs that help coordinate access 
agreements between private property landowners and members of the public. 
A. Limited and Targeted Supply by Market Products 
The excitement for using market-based techniques—particularly sharing 
economy ideas—to achieve resource protection and conservation-related purposes 
includes, but is not limited to access rights. Conservation advocates are learning 
that they can “rent” the private property of owners whose property can serve as 
vehicles for conservation of resources—asking the owners to aid and abet 
conservation by both restraint and commission.26 “Using the Airbnb Model to 
Protect the Environment” was the eye-catching title for a December 2017 article in 
the New York Times describing this phenomenon.27 Sometimes, for example, they 
might figuratively “rent” the land as if it were an Airbnb, asking a farmer not to cut 
forests; or, they might pay to enlist the owner in activities that generate species 
assistance, such as by paying for the creation of wetlands along migratory bird 
paths.28 All of these show a willingness for conservation-minded individuals to 
embrace sharing economy ideas and market solutions when they are presented, and 
an increasing willingness to innovate with market mechanisms in mind as means 
for achieving ends often perceived as reachable only by command and control. 
Turning to access initiatives specifically, though, we see a number of 
examples emerging where innovators are finding ways to coordinate agreements 
through market mechanisms between property owners and outsiders. Beyond 
academia and progressive property scholars, activists and outdoor enthusiasts too 
are pushing for greater recreational access rights—sometimes through government 
mandates, sometimes through public/private cooperative approaches, and 
sometimes through pure market bargaining. Some advocate a general right to 
roam,29 while others take more targeted approaches. The Surfrider Foundation,30 
 
 26. Seema Jayachandran, Using the Airbnb Model to Protect the Environment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/business/economy/airbnb-protect-environment.html 
(describing “market-based” strategies to “rent” protected land during periods when migratory birds need 
it most for safe passage or when threatened species need it for breeding; including, for example, paying 
rice farmers to flood their fields when they might otherwise be dry—or to make payments to individuals 
willing to make conservation efforts, such as to farmers who agree to refrain from cutting in certain 
forests.). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Jonathan Wood, Sharing Economy Conservation: Why Technology Solves Complex 
Environmental Problems Better than Regulation, PROP. & ENV’T RES. CTR. (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.perc.org/2018/02/15/sharing-economy-conservation-technology-solves-complex-
environmental-problems-better-regulation/ (describing how technology is making conservation efforts 
more accessible and efficient, including explaining how the sharing economy model has worked for the 
Nature Conservancy’s migratory bird creation of “pop-up wetlands” and the use of smart phones to 
crowd source for information on where the birds are sighted to know what areas to “rent” or make 
payments to flood). 
 29. See, e.g., KEN ILGUNAS, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: HOW WE LOST THE RIGHT TO ROAM AND 
HOW TO TAKE IT BACK (2018); KEN ILGUNAS, TRESPASSING ACROSS AMERICA 117-121 (2016). 
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for example, has campaigns advocating and obtaining enlarged coastal access 
including across private lands in addition to its agenda for preserving ocean and 
coastal quality.31 Similarly, there are a number of examples of innovative projects 
to assemble trail networks where private organizations act as intermediaries.32 
Byron Kahr, for instance, explains that West Virginia’s “Hatfield-McCoy system of 
ORV [off-road vehicles] trails and open riding areas represents the most successful 
assemblage of ORV riding opportunities on private lands.”33 He also highlights the 
arrangement in Vermont where there is a “public-private hybrid approach” in 
which the non-profit Vermont Association of Snow Travelers “administers the 
snowmobile routes in the state, eighty percent of which cross over private land.”34 
Each of these programs demonstrates that assembly of trails across multiple 
properties is possible, despite potential anti-commons and transaction cost 
concerns. 
Shawn Regan at the Property and Environment Research Center (PERC) 
explains that sharing economy technology is already starting on a small scale to 
facilitate greater outsider access to private Western lands.35 With a push, and so 
long as there truly is a demand for roaming rights, we should assume that these 
technologies could be applied on a broad scale to accomplish the type of market to 
roam envisioned in this article. 
Regan aptly notes that the “challenge is to build a platform that creates 
trust between users,” just as we see with Uber, Airbnb, and the like.36 He outlines 
 
 30. Beach Access, SURFRIDER FOUND., https://www.surfrider.org/initiatives/beach-access (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2018) (“Surfrider Foundation works with decision-making bodies to evaluate each beach 
access issue that arises. We also pursue litigation to ensure full and fair access to all beaches, for all 
people[,] . . actively fighting for beach access in places where private property owners have cut off long-
standing publicly used coastal access.”); see also Policy on Beach Access, SURFRIDER FOUND., 
https://www.surfrider.org/pages/policy-on-beach-access (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (“Whereas, Surfrider 
Foundation views beach access as a universal right. Surfrider Foundation works to secure universal, 
low-impact beach access for all people. Surfrider Foundation’s members live, work, visit, and recreate 
on and near the world’s beaches, and are impacted by beach access limitations.”). 
 31. See Ilgunas, supra note 12 (“The Surfrider Foundation, a nonprofit that advocates better beach 
access, reports that several states, including Maine, Massachusetts and Virginia, have favored the 
interests of beachfront property owners by limiting public access to shorelines. Hawaii and Oregon, on 
the other hand, have granted generous public access to their coasts.”). 
 32. Richard M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and the Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949, 977-78 
(2013) (“It is harder to dismiss the complaint that private organizations can (and do) play the role of 
intermediary. For example, hunters form clubs that lease hunting land, and hikers form organizations 
that create trails.”) (citing, inter alia, Ian Munn et al., Hunter Preferences and Willingness to Pay for 
Hunting Leases, 57 FOREST SCI. 189 (2011), http:// www.afoa.org/PDF/CI1107b.pdf); Our Strategic 
Plan, RIVANNA TRAILS FOUND., http:// www.rivannatrails.org/Default.aspx?pageId=952616 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150216174739/http://www.rivannatrails.org/page-952616] (describing a 
21-mile loop trail network created in Charlottesville, VA). 
 33. Byron Kahr, The Right to Exclude Meets the Right to Ride: Private Property, Public 
Recreation, and the Rise of Off-Road Vehicles, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 102 (2009). 
 34. Id. at 103. 
 35. Shawn Regan, Bringing the Sharing Economy to Private Land, PERC REP. 39, (2015), 
https://www.perc.org/wp-
content/uploads/old/pdfs/Bringing%20the%20Sharing%20Economy%20to%20Private%20Land_Regan
_0.pdf. 
 36. Id. 
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the type of technological extension that would be necessary to accomplish all sorts 
of access to private lands: 
Imagine if, with a few taps on your smartphone, you could rent 
access to a local property, book a fishing pass to a neighbor’s 
spring creek, or lease short-term hunting access on a nearby 
ranch. Landowners could enroll, define certain conditions and 
limits, and gain assurances that their property would be 
respected. In the process, they could diversify their incomes and 
have greater incentives to conserve their land.37 
Regan provides examples of private platforms and associated apps in areas 
like land sharing for camping access and hunting.38 Through “Airbnb-like 
websites,”39 companies like Land-Apart,40 Hipcamp,41 and Tentrr42 connect 
campers with private lands where they can set up camp and allows owners to list 
their properties as available to share with campers. Rod, Gun, and Bow is a new 
company that touts its brand of matching hunters with leasing opportunities on 
private lands as “Your land-sharing matchmaker.”43 South Park Fly Fishers is an 
example of a platform connecting fly fishermen with fly fishing experiences on 
“premier Colorado ranches.”44 Whether it be a room in your house or a route across 
your backyard, similar principles apply. It is not hard to envision, with the right 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (describing companies called “Hipcamp” and “Rod, Gun, and Bow”). 
 39. Sarah Gilman, Private-land Camping Startups Offer Alternative to Public Lands: Airbnb-like 
Websites Spring up in Response to Overcrowded Public Campsites, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, (July 20, 
2015), https://www.hcn.org/issues/47.12/private-land-camping-startups-offer-alternative-to-public-
lands. 
 40. LANDAPART THE LAND SHARING PROGRAM, https://www.landapart.com/home (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2018) (website explains that: “Landowners share their lands. You book and enjoy them. Ramble 
responsibly.”). 
 41. HIPCAMP, https://www.hipcamp.com/about#our-story (last visited Sept. 7, 2018) ((website 
proclaims service as a way to “Find Yourself Outside;” and, “Hipcamp is everywhere you want to camp. 
Search, discover and book ranches, farms, vineyards, nature preserves & public sites for camping across 
the U.S.”). Hipcamp explains it services as follows: “Our overall mission is to get more people outside 
and, more specifically, to inspire the next generation of people who are passionate about exploring AND 
protecting our lands. Spending time outdoors has proven health benefits and fosters a deeper connection 
to the awesome, wild world out there. And we’re firm believers that people will only protect what they 
connect to and care about. Getting more people outside really starts with access; access to land, but also 
to information about that land. We don’t think finding somewhere to camp should be such a time-
consuming, convoluted and confusing process, which is why we started Hipcamp. We are committed to 
making getting outside fun, easy, and as simple as selecting what, when and where you want your 
camping experience to be. Need a campsite by the beach next weekend where you can bring your dog? 
We got you!).” 
 42. For the home page for Tentrr, see https://www.tentrr.com/. In their promotional materials, 
Tentrr represents explains: “We aim to take the hassle out of camping so that you can enjoy your time 
outdoors. We connect landowners with campers seeking to explore the great outdoors.” See 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u2r6MJ-48U0 (Tag line associated with Tentrr promotional video). 
 43. ROD GUN AND BOW LLC, https://rodgunandbowllc.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 7, 
2018). 
 44. SOUTH PARK FLY FISHERS, https://www.southparktrout.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). 
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technical support, a business model that launches a market to roam. If you build it, 
they will roam. 
While some companies have emerged to offer their assembly services and 
sub-licensing of trail access,45 the same is also accomplished by organizations of 
like-minded recreationists. For example, in late December 2017, the Idaho State 
Snowmobile Association announced that it “has carved out a deal with a company 
owned by two Texas billionaires to groom trails on a portion of their private land 
near New Meadows, allowing access . . . for snowmobilers to forest and state lands 
otherwise blocked by the Wilkses’ property.”46 Likewise, Peter Kenlan describes 
one example of a cooperative access agreement where “private groups [who] have 
taken the initiative to develop relationships with landowners to secure access,” such 
as the Maine Snowmobile Association’s umbrella oversight of a variety of local 
clubs’ bargained-for “network of 14,000 miles of trails, 95% of which are on 
private property.”47 Momentum is definitely building to find innovative ways to 
match access demands with access supply, and the market is already generating 
products that capitalize on individual preferences for greater and more flexible 
recreational access. 
B. Limited Supply by Governmental Products and the Push for More 
Evidence of demand for access rights is also revealed by examining 
existing statutes, governmental programs, and legal definitions of the scope of 
property rights that already attempt to generate access or limit rights of exclusion. 
In other words, exclusion is not absolute under the law and does not even start as 
the default assumption of rights’ assignment in all instances. Mandated access 
rights are not unknown in the United States. Public beaches, traditional Native 
American sites, and other limited areas trigger the imposition of implied rights of 
access.48 In many states, unenclosed private property is open to certain recreational 
activities unless the private property owner clearly “opts out” by excluding 
 
 45. Kahr, supra note 33, at 102. 
 46. Rocky Barker, Texas Billionaires Open Up Some Land Access, let Idaho Snowmobilers Groom 
Trails, IDAHO STATESMAN, Dec. 19, 2017, 
http://www.idahostatesman.com/outdoors/recreation/article190549684.html. 
 47. Peter H. Kenlan, Comment, Maine’s Open Lands: Public Use of Private Land, the Right to 
Roam, and the Right to Exclude, 68 ME. L. REV. 185, 193 (2016). 
 48. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365-66 (N.J. 1984). For a 
sampling of articles discussing actual or proposed specialized public access rights in the United States, 
see also Darla J. Mondou, The American Indian Agricultural Resources Management Act: Does the 
Winters Water Bucket Have a Hole In It?, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 381 (1998); Mary Christina Wood, The 
Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part II): Asserting a Sovereign Servitude to Protect Habitat 
of Imperiled Species, 25 VT. L. REV. 355 (2001); Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to 
Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061 (2005); 
Claudia Braymer, Comment, Improving Public Access to the Adirondack Forest Preserve, 72 ALB. L. 
REV. 293 (2009); Becky Lundberg Witt, Towards a Human Right to Food: Implications for Urban 
Growing in Baltimore City, Maryland, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 405 (2016); Alfred L. Brophy, Property 
and Progress: Antebellum Landscape Art and Property Law, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 603 (2009); 
Hamilton, supra note 5; Kahr, supra note 33; Kenlan, supra note 47. 
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individuals, such as through “no trespassing” postings and fencing.49 Given that 
many advocates are still pushing for a mandated right to roam, it seems they must 
find existing programs insufficient for achieving access. Advocates for market-
based approach to roaming will find current governmental programs either 
unsupporting of, or perhaps even interfering with, the creation of market-based 
roaming approaches. Nonetheless, the existing legal standards and programs 
discussed below are something that reforms designed to generate more roaming 
access must deal with—building upon them or remodeling around or through them. 
This article can only begin to provide some examples of such existing access 
measures, but should help develop a basic understanding of the present nature of 
access rights more generally. 
First among the legal regimes facilitating access are “posting” laws. A 
number of states have laws that allow the public to access unenclosed but private 
lands for “recreational purposes” (with varying definitions of what constitutes 
“recreation”)50 unless and until the private property owners “post” markings 
asserting their rights to exclude (such as fencing, no trespassing signs, designated 
paint signals regarding borders and owner assertion of exclusion rights, etc.). Put 
another way, in many states the failure to post creates an implied permission to the 
public to recreational access across private lands.51 Depending on the state, this 
requirement that property owners must opt to expressly assert their exclusion rights 
before they may seek full enforcement of those exclusion rights varies in scope and 
application.52 
For example, the failure to post exclusion notices may affect the 
designation of trespass and the immunization of intruders under criminal trespass, 
civil trespass, or both. In Maine, for example, there is an understanding of the 
concept of “permissive trespass.”53 As another example, California makes posting 
necessary to give notice before holding one liable for criminal trespass.54 
The access rights granted by states are often associated with rights to 
travel or access to public resources (like water and wildlife) that exist on private 
land. For example, South Dakota has a complex system of open access and hunting 
rights along section lines even across private property.55 In most states, the use of 
 
 49. See generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Effect of Statute Limiting Landowner’s Liability for 
Personal Injury to Recreational User, 47 A.L.R. 4th 262 (1986). 
 50. Id. See also generally Kahr, supra note 33; Kenlan, supra note 47 (surveys of the recreational 
use statutes across jurisdictions). 
 51. See, e.g., Kenlan, supra note 47, at 195 (citation omitted) (describing the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court’s view of permissive use: “Maine has a tradition of acquiescence in access to nonposted 
fields and woodlands by abutters and by the public. Pursuant to our open lands tradition, recreational use 
of unposted open fields or woodlands and any ways through them are presumed permissive[.]”). 
 52. Kahr, supra note 33, at 83 (“State statutes requiring posting on unenclosed land in order to 
trigger criminal trespass violations are common, although they are not uniform in form or in wording.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Kenlan, supra note 47, at 192-93, 196-98 (describing the diversity of access 
protections throughout Maine under permissive trespass doctrines in unposted areas). 
 54. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 602 (West 2008) (“no trespassing” signs required and must be 
regularly and conspicuously placed). 
 55. Tom Simmons, Comment, Highways, Hunters and Section Lines: Tensions Between Public 
Access and Private Rights, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 240 (1997) (describing the open public 
access and hunting rights along section lines and their relationship with R.S. 2477 federal rights of way). 
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navigable waterways often trumps private owners’ rights to exclude as well, 
because of their inherent service value to the public and its enjoyment of public 
resources.56 
With certain rights like hunting, some states go beyond the opt-in posting 
requirement and grant hunters positive rights to hunt on unenclosed lands even in 
the face of postings or other efforts by the private landowners to exclude them.57 
For example, Kenlan describes this outcome in South Carolina by judicial 
interpretation58 and in Vermont by constitutional decree.59 Other states treat 
hunting access as special and start from a default rule that hunters shall have rights 
of access, but nonetheless give property owners opportunities to assert certain 
exclusion rights.60 Anderson summarizes the “posting” rules for hunting across the 
states and their effects: 
State statutes in the United States governing public access to private land 
focus mainly on hunting rights. About half of the states have enacted “posting” 
rules, which generally allow access to private land for hunting, without the 
landowner’s specific permission, unless the land has been posted with “no 
trespassing” signs. The other states require hunters to obtain permission from 
landowners before hunting and do not require posting. In at least some of these 
states, the statutory requirement of posting to prohibit access could apply to 
recreational access as well as to hunting, which would allow a hiker to presume 
permission to walk across unposted lands. In most of the states that require posting, 
however, hunting is given a preferred status over public access for other purposes.61 
Hunting’s preferred status makes it a unique category of access, but the 
government response to that demand shows that statutes that require property 
owners to allow access—by coercive adjustment of rights rather than consensual 
agreement—are not unknown in the United States. Some individuals are able to 
gain inclusion rights outside of bargaining. 
Government programs like hunting access statutes—where the 
government facilitates the matching of demanding-hunters with landowners willing 
to provide access—are interesting examples of state-led facilitation and 
 
 56. See Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown, 53 N.E.3d 730 (N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted) 
(recognizing public easements for waters that are navigable in fact and that “provide practical utility to 
the public as a means for transportation, whether for trade or travel”). See also generally Maureen E. 
Brady, Defining “Navigability”: Balancing State-Court Flexibility and Private Rights in Waterways, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1415 (2015) (discussing the rules of public access to navigable waterways). 
 57. See Kenlan, supra note 47, at 190. 
 58. See, e.g., id. (citation omitted) (explaining a case from South Carolina where “the state supreme 
court refused to find a hunter liable for trespass when the hunter openly defied the landowner’s order to 
keep off” because of “the hunter’s positive right to hunt on unenclosed land.”). 
 59. Id. (“In Vermont, the state’s constitution specifically protects” a hunter’s right to access 
unenclosed land.); VT. CONST. CH. II, § 67 (“The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable 
times, to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not inclosed, and in like manner to 
fish in all boatable and other waters (not private property) under proper regulations, to be made and 
provided by the General Assembly.”). 
 60. Kahr, supra note 33, at 84 (“Many states have adopted specific trespass rules with respect to 
hunters entering private land, and generally, such statutes require landowners to take specific affirmative 
steps to keep hunters off of their land.”). 
 61. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 422. 
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coordination between property owners and groups of strangers interested in 
accessing property. For example, Montana’s block management program (“BMP”) 
creates a coordinated system that allows hunters to hunt on multiple landowners’ 
properties through a single bi-lateral registration system.62 Hunters who register are 
allowed to access and remove game from private property without burdensome 
individualized negotiation, provided certain use restrictions negotiated between the 
landowner and the Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks department are satisfied.63 
Kahr describes a similar program in Kansas which he argues—while advocating for 
its use as a potential model for greater ORV access—represents “a successful 
approach to balancing the interests of private landowners and hunters seeking 
access to open lands.”64 Kansas’s “‘Walk-In Hunting Access Program,’ . . . has 
enrolled over one million acres of private land across the state, resulting in a steep 
increase in available hunting opportunities.”65 The program starts with an 
exclusion-based default and offers incentives for property owners to choose to 
grant permission.66 Further the Kansas program “operat[es]with the presumption 
that lands are off-limits to hunters until a landowner affirmatively opts into the 
program.”67 The state continues its role as facilitator by providing maps and 
information “documenting all available private lands” thus helping licensed hunters 
overcome barriers they might face in identifying willing owners.68 While each of 
these examples of government coordinated programs show the possibility of such 
measures to increase public access, Professor Neil Hamilton, an agricultural law 
professor who has studied various natural resource access issues, especially in rural 
areas, notes that “there are only limited examples of coordinated programs to 
promote public use of private land.”69 
Other types of access fall into a category that might be called “government 
administered” rather than “government-coordinated.” For example, as a result of 
the 2014 Farm Bill, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resource 
Conservation Service administers the Voluntary Public Access and Habitat 
Incentive Program (VPA-HIP), which “is a competitive grants program that helps 
state and tribal governments increase public access to private lands for wildlife-
dependent recreation, such as hunting, fishing, nature watching or hiking.”70 As the 
program description continues, “State and tribal governments may submit 
proposals for VPA-HIP block grants from NRCS. These governments provide the 
 
 62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-266 (2011). 
 63. Id.; see also State v. McGregor, 398 P.3d 241 (Mont. 2017) (holding individual liable for 
trespass for hunting on private land without obtaining permission by complying with Block 
Management Area procedures). 
 64. Kahr, supra note 33, at 101. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 101-102 (citations omitted). 
 67. Id. at 101. 
 68. Id. (“Licensed hunters receive maps from the state documenting all available private lands, thus 
reducing the informational burden on both hunters and landowners for determining where hunting is 
permitted.”) (citations omitted). 
 69. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 200. 
 70. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2014 Farm Bill- Voluntary Public Access and Habitat Incentive 
Program- NCRS, https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/programs/farmbill/?cid=
stelprdb1242739. 
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funds to participating private landowners to initiate new or expand existing public 
access programs that enhance public access to areas previously unavailable for 
wildlife-dependent recreation.”71 Administering payments to change private 
landowner behavior is one way to attempt to accomplish public policy goals. 
However, it is a far more complicated and bureaucratic means as compared to 
facilitating private bargaining by embracing broader markets for access. 
But some of the features of these government programs could provide 
lessons for engineers of access markets. Policymakers should examine these and 
similar arrangements to consider whether parts of their structures and incentives 
could serve as inputs for developing a market to roam. Especially helpful could be 
those programs that coordinate property owners opting-in, with those seeking 
access using a centralized registration and information repository for obtaining 
permissions. Platforms in a market to roam might serve similar centralized and 
transaction cost-reducing functions. Roamers and property owners could arrange 
for contracts, licenses, or property rights exchanges that grant access and roaming 
privileges through third party platforms which manage the exchange. 
IV. RESTRICTING THE OPERATION OF THE RIGHT TO 
EXCLUDE: PROGRESSIVE PROPERTY THEORY  
AND MANDATED ACCESS FOR ROAMING 
Our property system involved legislative and judicially-imposed 
limitations on the right to exclude to facilitate certain competing policies,72 
including to serve “human values” (like access to services for migrant farm 
workers in the famous opinion in the State v. Shack case).73 Many of these policies 
lead to limited, mandated access rights for particular purposes. But broad-scale 
access rights generally—and broad-scale roaming rights particularly—have not 
been mandated in the United States. In contrast, several countries have recently 
made the choice to legislate rights to roam that mandate access and limit private 
property owners’ rights to exclude.74 Recently, such statutes granting rights to 
access and to roam across private property have been popping up in jurisdictions 
around the globe, particularly in Europe.75 Generally speaking, these statutes seek 
to prevent individual property owners from denying access to or otherwise 
excluding those who want to roam across their property, provided the roaming 
meets certain conditions and the roamer abides by certain rules.76 This compelled 
inclusion has been heralded by progressive property scholars and mandated-
roaming advocates as an example of sound public policy to reshape the property 
system toward social obligations with inclusion norms. Furthermore, it proves that 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. See supra Part III. 
 73. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human values. They are 
recognized to that end, and are limited by it.”). 
 74. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 856 (8th ed. 2014) (describing the basics of the 
right to roam and recent scholarship on the same). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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the right to exclude is not necessary for a well-functioning system of property 
ownership.77 
Within progressive property theory, exclusion norms are characterized as 
furthering a vision of property that is atomistic, monopolistic, and isolationist. 
Roaming, however, is often romanticized as the exercise of natural liberty where 
wandering is the “essence of empowerment”78 for which fences and boundaries are 
impediments. 
A number of European statutes have been cited by American progressive 
property scholars as models that could be used to increase roaming rights in the 
United States by governmental mandate. For example, the Countryside and Rights 
of Way Act of 2000 (“CRWA”) in Great Britain is relatively recent legislation 
developing statutory rights to roam consistent with the progressive property 
platform.79 Professor Jerry Anderson—whose scholarship has been influential in 
identifying the connection between progressive property theory and roaming 
rights—explains what is happening with the CRWA: 
Britain’s recent enactment of a “right to roam” in the Countryside and 
Rights of Way Act 2000 [CRWA] provides a fascinating study of how the right to 
exclude may be modified to accommodate public needs without unduly impacting 
the interests of the private landowner. [CRWA] classifies private land that contains 
mountains, moors, heath, or downland as “open country,” and requires landowners 
to allow the public to roam freely across these lands. Thus, [CRWA] opens up 
millions of acres of private land to public access, without compensating the 
landowners for this limitation on their right to exclude. As a result, the law 
represents a dramatic shift in the allocation of the bundle of sticks.80 
One of the ways that the CRWA (and many of the European roaming 
initiatives) can be distinguished from roaming reform movements in the United 
States is in its effort to repair past acts perceived as wrongs. The CRWA is 
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designed to restore general rights to roam that were claimed to have existed in the 
past, but that have been extinguished by enclosure orders.81 
Sweden, too, has developed limits on landowners’ exclusion rights.82 
Cornell Law Dean Eduardo Peñalver describes this as “the so-called allemansrätt, 
or ‘everyman’s right’ to roam over the countryside in ways that do not damage the 
land, intrude on privacy, or interfere with the uses to which the owner has chosen 
to put her land.”83 
Another example of roaming laws in Europe is the Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act of 2003. Professor John Lovett has identified its fit with the goals of 
“progressive theorists” of property law—a camp he identifies as “those scholars 
who call for American property law to embrace a social obligation norm aiming to 
maximize human flourishing at all times and who welcome a more contextualized 
property law decision making process focused on producing relationships of 
dignity, fairness, and respect.”84 Lovett continues by explaining why these scholars 
are supportive of efforts to create greater protections for roaming rights: 
These “progressive” or “social obligation” theorists picture individuals, 
and by extension property owners, as fundamentally dependent on human 
community. In moments of conflict, this interdependence requires property law 
decision makers to determine whether a property owner’s interest in autonomy and 
control over her asset must be sacrificed, sometimes without compensation or strict 
reciprocity, to satisfy a non-owner’s need for access to that asset or the 
community’s interest in control over use or disposition of that asset.85 
Professor Gregory Alexander provides similar sentiments in his own 
history of Scotland’s traditions regarding roaming and its modern right to roam 
under the 2003 Scottish Land Reform Act.86 Alexander explains that roaming rights 
contribute to a “socially democratic culture.”87 Although sympathetic to the idea of 
roaming rights for this and other progressive reasons, Alexander cautions that “the 
point must not be pushed too far, for under some circumstances shared public 
spaces can be sites of social divisions.”88 
Lovett’s study was prescriptive as well, outlining a framework for 
transforming our exclusion-centric property law regime in the United States.89 
 
 81. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 378-79. 
 82. REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 2:15 (Swed.) http://www.riksdagen.se/globalassets/
07.-dokument--lagar/the-constitution-of-sweden-160628.pdf; see generally Kevin T. Colby, Public 
Access to Private Land—Allemansrätt in Sweden, 15 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 253 (2015) (explaining 
why “Allemansrätt is an example of land ‘ownership’ of a different kind”). 
 83. Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191, 206 n.60 (2010). 
 84. Lovett, Progressive Property, supra note 10, at 742-43; accord. John A. Lovett, The Right to 
Exclude Meets the Right of Responsible Access, 26 PROB. & PROP. 52 (2012) (surveying developments 
in European roaming laws); Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP. L. 
REV. 665 (2011). 
 85. Lovett, Progressive Property, supra note 10, at 744-45. 
 86. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003 (A.S.P. 2). 
 87. Gregory S. Alexander, The Sporting Life: Democratic Culture and the Historical Origins of the 
Scottish Right to Roam, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 321, 323 (2016). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Lovett, Progressive Property, supra note 10, at 816-17. 
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Lovett concludes his work by explaining what such a transformation would mean 
and the values he hopes it could accomplish: 
[I]t is practically possible for a modern, democratic nation 
committed to the rule of law, the protection of private property, 
and open markets to create, if it wants, a property regime that to a 
considerable extent replaces the ex ante presumption in favor of 
the right to exclude that has come to be taken for granted in the 
United States with an equally robust, but rebuttable, ex ante 
presumption in favor of access.90 
Lovett describes his project as demonstrating that “it is possible to create a 
property access regime that does not depend on further boundary drawing and a 
narrow conception of the access rights that the public might enjoy on private 
land.”91 The Scottish roaming rights example, he contends, proves the viability of 
establishing a legal regime that is “open-ended in texture and that aims to inspire a 
new relationship between landowner and non-owner access takers, a relationship 
based on mutual respect for the rights of the other,” and that “can, despite some 
unavoidable uncertainty costs, incorporate and seek to inspire virtues of 
responsibility, humility, and mutual regard.”92 Mandated roaming rights are 
intended to serve a very bold agenda. 
Of course, one must ask whether relationships can really be inspired when 
they are forced. It may make more sense to encourage innovation that generates 
consensual roaming exchanges which seem far more likely to develop relationships 
between owner and roamer in a way that forced socialization cannot. 
Anderson, for one, represents the views of progressive property scholars 
in endorsing these types of legislation. He laments the absence of a right to roam as 
a costly consequence of the American preference for an “absolute right to 
exclude.”93 One of the goals that Anderson claims will be advanced in societies that 
embrace a mandated right to roam is greater access to ecological resources, along 
with enhanced means of transportation, mental health improvement, better physical 
health, a connection to history and culture, and a more developed sense of 
community.94 On the matter of breaking down property rights to provide ecological 
amenities to the public, Anderson states: 
Roaming rights and footpaths enable the walker to reach places that are 
not yet spoiled by urban development, from which a road would detract. A hike 
may lead to a beautiful vista, or a mountain stream, surrounded by natural beauty 
unblemished by concrete and steel. Walking through the scenery, such as hiking on 
a footpath through a meadow of grazing sheep, puts you in the middle of the 
beauty, and makes you a part of it, rather than simply observing it through a car 
window. The effect is therefore more like a three-dimensional image than a picture 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 379. 
 94. Id. at 413-17. 
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postcard. Moreover, the slow pace allows for a more intimate observation of the 
wildlife and plants that abound in the countryside.95 
This idea of roaming as facilitating the connection with nature—said to be 
cut off through owners’ rights to exclude—is a primary justification advanced for 
the assertion of mandated roaming rights.96 
When reading the dominant current literature on roaming, it mostly comes 
from progressive property scholars who see great benefit in its proof “that the 
composition of the bundle [of property rights] is not necessarily immutable, and 
that changes may be desirable to better reflect contemporary society’s needs and 
values.”97 As Anderson contends, “Britain’s right to roam represents a rather 
dramatic re-allocation of one of the sticks in the property rights bundle from the 
landowner to the public.”98 He continues, that “property rights must evolve and the 
right to roam reminds us that, in the end, the recognition of the private owners’ 
rights involves a trade-off with public interests that should not be ignored.”99 This 
progressive property agenda counsels that “the right to roam represents a welcome 
return to a more interrelated, functional approach to property”100 that Americans 
should consider embracing.101 Progressive property scholars’ policy position rests 
on the idea that mandated roaming rights are just one of “numerous ways . . . to 
allocate the bundle of sticks without abandoning the idea of private property in 
general.”102 After all, Anderson claims, it is “possible to construct a strong 
argument in favor of modifying the formalistic notion of an absolute right to 
exclude.”103 
The vast majority of the existing literature on roaming is supportive of the 
statutory schemes that limit the right to exclude as a way to facilitate what the 
advocates have identified as preferred social values of property. In other words, 
most existing work on how to increase roaming access has trusted the government 
as the mechanism for achieving more of it and all but ignored potential market 
alternatives. 
Moreover, there have been few scholars challenging the assumptions in 
the mandates-based progressive property literature on roaming. Among these is 
Professor Eric Claeys.104 One problematic claim in the pro-government roaming 
literature, Claeys contends, is the assumption that owners must be forced to allow 
roaming in order to realize the activity.105 Claeys challenges this by explaining 
 
 95. Id. at 413. 
 96. Of course, as later parts of this article will reveal, if it is the access that increases such a 
connection, then there should be equal (or superior) benefits if the access can be accomplished through 
alternative means—like with voluntary transfers of rights. See infra Part IX. 
 97. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 430. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Ilgunas, supra note 12 (“If we want to create more safe and scenic walking spaces, we should 
look to Europe’s roaming laws for ideas on opening up our countryside.”). 
 102. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam, supra note 17, at 431. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Claeys, supra note 9, at 462-65. 
 105. Id. 
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(while not advocating any proposal) that the government might choose to “buy or 
condemn scenic paths” to achieve similar purposes without as much disruption on 
traditional notions of property rights.106 
Professors Jonathan Klick and Gideon Parchomovsky have used roaming 
statutes as a way to quantify the value of the right to exclude by measuring the 
devaluation of property when roaming interferes with an owner’s exclusion 
rights.107 They provide a detailed history of the right to roam and a useful survey of 
the literature on the right to exclude.108 While they caution that their work “should 
not be interpreted as a flat-out rejection of the right to roam,”109 their findings 
nonetheless show that the passage of the right to roam statutes in England and 
Scotland have had a negative effect on real estate prices—even when these forced 
rights to roam could be characterized as relatively “minor” invasions of the right to 
exclude (because they were far less intrusive than contemplated alternatives).110 
Their findings support the conclusion that owners and potential transferees do place 
a value on the level of exclusion rights available as part of a particular ownership 
package for a parcel.111 
Thus, the progressive property scholarship demonstrates an existing 
demand for more roaming rights yet seems to assume that a market with strong 
exclusion norms is incapable of supplying it. This article’s primary hope is that the 
sketch of a market to roam will open up that presumption to greater questioning. 
Furthermore, the progressive property scholarship provides evidence of demand for 
roaming rights—thereby supporting the conclusion that there may in fact be 
customers for a market to roam if it emerges. 
V. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AS  
EMPOWERING INCLUSION AND ACCESS 
The assumptions about exclusion that exist in progressive property theory 
fail to capture the richness of the exclusion concept. Inclusion need not be coerced 
and mandated at the expense of the right to exclusion. Indeed, protecting exclusion 
is a way to empower an owner to supply even more opportunities for inclusion to 
those who make marketplace demands for it. 
Allowing stranger non-owners access to roam freely without prior 
permission across private property seems antithetical to our intuitive notions of 
what it means to own something. Norms have developed, at least in the United 
States, that give us a sense of it being wrong to enter the property of another 
 
 106. Id. (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that mandated roaming rights are desirable. A government 
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 107. See generally Klick & Parchomovsky, supra note 10. 
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 109. Id. at 922. 
 110. Id. at 961. See also Claeys, supra note 9, at 463 (discussing the Klick and Parchomovsky study 
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uses.”). 
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without permission.112 These intuitions are representative of an understanding that 
the system of property is grounded in concepts like owners’ dominion and 
control—the ability of those who own to regulate the ingress and egress across 
their property. More technically, these notions are grounded in a right to exclude. If 
we start from the proposition that exclusion is the default—admittedly something 
that is disputed by some in the academic community—we can begin to see how 
owners can subsequently enter into agreements and arrangements that further, 
rather than impair, social relations with property. 
The right to exclude serves important functions in ordering society and in 
developing our relationships involving property. It is from exclusion that we can 
understand the transfer of rights in property, the incentives to invest in property, 
and the overall management of relationships between owners and outsiders to the 
rights. The story of property rights is, in the end, a story about an ownership 
package with exclusion as a critical element. 
That ownership package is commonly described as the metaphorical 
“bundle of sticks,” with each “stick” in “the bundle” representing some specific 
attribute of such ownership.113 Professor Katheleen Guzman provides an excellent 
description of what it means to have a stick in the bundle of property rights: 
Legal theory divorces the term “property” from the item itself to instead 
describe relative rights vis-a-vis that item. “Property” thus means things one can do 
with Blackacre (entitlements) including its use, possession and consumption, as 
well as enjoying its fruits, the ability to exclude others from its use, and the ability 
to transfer it. Although ownership suggests the assemblage of all such rights in one 
person who then totes the full “bundle of sticks,” one may properly speak of 
“owning” a lone entitlement or stick . . . Legally, the right itself is the property.114 
 
 112. See Donald J. Kochan, Playing with Real Property Inside Augmented Reality: Pokémon Go, 
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 113. Grey’s formulation of the bundle is useful: “Most people, including most specialists in their 
unprofessional moments, conceive of property as things that are owned by persons. To own property is 
to have exclusive control over something – to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, 
leave it idle, or destroy it. Legal restraints on the free use of one’s property are conceived as departures 
from an ideal conception of full ownership. By contrast, the theory of property rights held by the 
modern specialist . . . fragments the robust unitary conception of ownership into a more shadowy 
‘bundle of rights.’” 
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The right to exclude—epitomized in the trespass cause of action—is 
fundamental to the law of property.115 Trespass is grounded on these exclusion 
rights held by property owners116 because it is a doctrine that defines the wrongs 
committed when “one person physically invades the land of another.”117 A trespass 
“consists of doing any of the following without lawful justification: (1) entering on 
to land in the possession of another, (2) remaining on the land, or (3) placing or 
projecting any object on it.”118 From all of these definitions, it should not be hard to 
see that, normally, roaming on the land of another is just a kind way to describe a 
trespassory act. 
Trespass and other legal doctrines regularly recognize the right to exclude 
because the law starts with the presumption that property owners can choose who 
to include, when, and under what conditions.119 Such conditions might include 
payment for access. When we fail to recognize the right to exclude, property 
owners lose the ability to profit from such selling of access rights. Furthermore, 
property owners may especially want to control stranger access because those 
owners can sometimes be liable for actions taken by individuals on their property 
or even liable to trespassers that get injured while on their property. 
The Supreme Court has regularly given the “right to exclude” recognition 
as fundamental to property.120 Property owners have a level of dominion and 
control that allows them to manage property rights, including the power to exercise 
the right to include which is an extension of the choice to not assert the right to 
exclude. Owners may very well need to do certain things to protect their exclusive 
borders—like post signs, fences, or other notices to others121—but, so long as they 
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meet these hurdles, the general enforceability of exclusion is strong in the 
American system. 
The right to exclude, however, is more textured than the name implies. 
Exclusion is what makes it possible to thereafter apportion parts of the rights in a 
property to others. Included among the ancillary rights under the exclusion 
umbrella is the inclusion right.122 A leading property textbook describes this 
combination as “a relationship among people that entitles so-called owners to 
include (that is, permit) or exclude (that is, deny) use or possession of the owned 
property by other people.”123 
Professor Daniel Kelly’s research catalogs the ubiquity of the right to 
include within property law, and he concludes, “The ability of owners to ‘include’ 
others in their property is a central attribute of ownership and fundamental to any 
system of private property.”124 This ability to include makes possible mutually 
beneficial exchanges—owners are willing to respond to demand from friends and 
strangers alike who are willing to offer something of value as consideration in 
exchange for being allowed to access the owner’s property. 
Exclusion rights themselves allow owners to thereafter apportion rights 
within the thing we call property, including land. Among available ways to 
apportion property are the splitting of interests, formally or informally, and this 
right to include others in the use and enjoyment of the property. Consequently, it 
follows that from the greater right to exclude, control entry, and forbid all others 
comes the lesser right to include—which involves the decision to choose not to 
enforce one’s right to exclude to its fullest extent and to instead permit access. 
Inclusion is about allowing access and sharing one’s ownership with 
others.125 If one owns property, then they control access to it. They have the ability 
to permit roaming precisely because they have the power to prohibit it.126 
Fundamental principles of property law supporting inclusion and sharing127 
underlay the obvious point that property owners can choose to include roamers. If 
owners transfer rights of access to roamers, then the sharing of these access rights 
becomes simply an extension of one’s ability to use and control the property one 
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property.”). 
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owns.128 That is why “[t]he two rights [to exclude and to include] are the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of transferability.”129 The inclusion stick and its offshoots 
allowing the granting of access rights empower owners to permit non-owners to 
access and use their property, including through mechanisms like roaming.130 
VI. FACILITATING INCLUSION: LESSONS FROM  
THE SHARING ECONOMY AND THE UTILITY OF 
 EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL PLATFORMS 
“Sharing” as used in the “sharing economy” context generally means that 
assets or services—like one’s home in the homesharing market or one’s fields in a 
roaming market—are allowed to be accessed, possessed, used or consumed by 
someone other than the property owner (or, in other contexts, the provider of the 
services).131 The sub-markets already emerging in the sharing economy provide a 
blueprint for countless new ways to match demand with heretofore unknown 
supply. The sharing economy offers several models which should be studied to 
execute the creation of a market to roam. What Uber, Airbnb, and the like have 
done is contribute to the proof of concept for the right to roam. Knowledge of the 
existence of demand for a market to roam supports the belief that there should be 
incentives for entrepreneurial platform operators to begin building the market 
mechanisms that can allow the market to come into being. 
Sharing in the sharing economy has taken off due to new market forces 
and technology that solve coordination and information problems.132 As Lobel 
documents, platforms facilitate sharing exchanges utilizing a variety of 
technological means of low transaction cost connections, facilitation of access to 
information between market participants, and reputation tracking to inject reliable 
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and confirmable trust ratings into the process.133 She explains that a “new wave of 
start-ups, relying on digital platform technology, are connecting people and 
transforming behavior and relationships outside of the digital world, tapping into 
underutilized human, social, and real capital. This new economy dramatically 
extends the lifecycle of products, shortens time of use, and exponentially expands 
connectivity and access.”134 There are individuals who lack access to property and 
goods (like people without homes, people without cars, people who previously 
used taxi cabs to get around or hotels to stay while on vacation, or hikers without 
land of their own upon which to roam) and later become consumers who demand 
alternative means of access to such property and goods. As such, business 
innovators are generating new platforms to facilitate collaborative, access-based 
consumption.135 
Sharing platforms are flexible products of innovation that are increasingly 
being repurposed for new applications.136 The success of the sharing economy is 
largely credited to new technologies, making new collaborations, connections, and 
exchanges feasible.137 As transaction costs decrease, more sharing agreements 
become attractive alternatives for achieving preferences.138 The literature on the 
sharing economy is already substantial,139 and it need not be replicated here. What 
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Property in the Sharing Economy, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 61, 77 (2015) (discussing how “new technologies 
and online markets have significantly lowered transaction costs for short term use of personal assets.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 139. See, e.g., RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: HOW COLLABORATIVE 
CONSUMPTION IS CHANGING THE WAY WE LIVE 67-96 (2010); Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, 
The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215 (2016); John Infranca, 
Intermediary Institutions and the Sharing Economy, 90 TUL. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 31 (2016); Miller, 
supra note 14; Zale, supra note 137, at 502-03 (“The sharing economy—the rapidly evolving sector of 
peer-to-peer transactions epitomized by Airbnb and Uber—is nothing if not controversial.”); Dyal-
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we know is that “[s]haring is no longer an idiosyncratic pursuit; it is now a 
mainstream manner of consumption.”140 
Economists explain that sharing arrangements make sense when 
individuals can make resources, which have not been used to their greatest 
potential, more active and accessible.141 With roaming, for example, there is land 
that need not be constantly occupied by its owners. And passage through or across 
one’s own land constitutes an asset of the land that is undoubtedly underutilized. 
Economic researchers Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell and Adam Thierer 
describe “the sharing economy as any marketplace that brings together distributed 
networks of individuals to share or exchange otherwise underutilized assets.”142 
Sharers are owners with assets that could generate a profit without interfering with 
the owner’s present use,143 and sharees are those who do not own but could benefit 
from the access that would otherwise be unavailable to them as non-owners of that 
asset.144 
In previous work, I have proposed the following definition for “sharing” 
in the sharing economy: 
Sharing of a good or real property exists when Owner (O) 
exercises her right to include by authorizing a Stranger to the 
property (S) the temporary right to use or access O’s property in 
some limited and defined manner—converting what would have 
been a trespassory act by S into a legal, non-trespassory act—
where such authorization is revocable by O in property law but 
where liability may exist in contract for any such revocation or 
interference by O in the rights or authority granted by O to S.145 
The explanation is particularly sensitive to the ideas that (1) property 
owners are sharing things they own, (2) are doing so precisely because they have 
the power to do so as owners, because (3) they own a sharing stick in their bundle 
of property rights. Owners can choose to share but also set the terms of the sharing 
arrangement, including charging a fee for the privilege of conditional or full access 
or offering it for free but with use conditions. The owner is exercising her right to 
include another in the access and benefits of her property. 
 
Chand, supra note 135; Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing 
Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 531 (2015); Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 138; Rashmi Dyal-Chand, 
Sharing the Cathedral, 46 CONN. L. REV. 647 (2013); Aloni, supra note 136. 
 140. Miller, supra note 14, at 201. 
 141. See generally, e.g., Koopman, supra note 139; Zeravs, supra note 137. 
 142. Koopman, supra note 139, at 531. 
 143. See generally Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 138, at 76 (“From the owner’s perspective, there are 
certain types of goods that have excess capacity when they are privately owned and consumed. Because 
the excess capacity is not used, certain types of goods are systematically underexploited.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 144. Dyal-Chand, supra note 135, at 253-54 (“In the areas of home and car sharing . . . individuals 
also share the excess capacity of assets that they do not fully use or need for themselves with 
strangers—for a price.” (footnote omitted)). 
 145. Kochan, supra note 125, at 947. 
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Most important in the access story behind the sharing economy is the 
advent of technological capacity that has only recently materialized to create the 
market infrastructure, complete with reliability and security measures, necessary to 
make such sharing efficient.146 As lower-cost, higher reliability mechanisms for 
making sharing more accessible and more profitable improve, expansion of sharing 
activity follows. 
Professor Julia Lee explains that new “[t]echnology has enabled 
innovative forms of exchange to emerge, spanning an ever-broader range of 
products and services.”147 With these technologies, connections are made with 
greater ease between the owners who can supply a product and the consumers who 
want to access it for a limited time or limited purpose. 148 Ratings systems—run 
through internet repositories and social networks-- that develop around the sharing 
activity reduce risks of dealing with strangers because of the reputational controls 
inherent in system. These systems in turn allow consumers to comment on 
suppliers and suppliers to comment on consumers of the shared products or 
services. 149 These trust- and reputation-networks create monitoring, verification, 
and quality-control mechanisms that are key to making sharing platforms attractive 
and safe.150 Reliable monitoring and rating systems can now be scaled because of 
the new information and connectivity technology.151 With roaming, for example, an 
owner might keep out roamers with reputations for poor stewardship. 
These systems generate confidence for consumers and for suppliers, each 
made more comfortable entering the sharing arrangements because they know 
accountability and reputational rating systems are available to assist their decision 
making and deter bad behavior.152 The Economist posited that the technological 
platforms supporting the sharing economy make it so that there is “the availability 
of more data about people and things [which] allows physical assets to be 
disaggregated and consumed as services.”153 This technological infrastructure 
supports the sharing economy because it provides “the market-thickening 
coordination mechanisms . . . such as coordinating on time and geography” 
previously present only in physical markets.154 
 
 146. See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 
COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1625 (2017); The Rise of the Sharing Economy: On the Internet, Everything is 
for Hire, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-
everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy (“technology has reduced transaction costs, making sharing assets 
cheaper and easier than ever—and therefore possible on a much larger scale.”). 
 147. Julia Y. Lee, Trust and Social Commerce, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 141 (2015). 
 148. See generally Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 43 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 67 (2016). 
 149. Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 132, at 2, 8 (explaining that the sharing economy businesses 
have proliferated in part because of technological advances but also because emerging “recommender 
systems and reputation systems . . . are central to the function of P2P rental markets.”). 
 150. Id at 8; see also Stemler, supra note 148 (discussing these “modern trust” systems). 
 151. Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 146, at 1635. 
 152. See Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, The Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback 
Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem”, U. MIAMI L. REV. 830, 869 (2016). 
 153. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 146. 
 154. Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 132, at 7. 
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It is this technology that can operate in a market to roam—where owners 
can share access to land with roamers who desire it. Because legal systems evolve 
in concert with technology, it should be expected that they can evolve around 
roaming rights to coordinate sharing relationships and serve the information cost-
reducing functions that have been seen in other already developed sharing markets. 
Experience proves that legal arrangements that are once uncertain suddenly can 
operate with the requisite reliability to support their adoption once paired with the 
right technological assistance. 
VII. BY WHAT MARKET MECHANISM WILL WE IDENTIFY THE 
TRADEABLE RIGHT TO ROAM? THE EVOLUTION AND 
ADAPTABILITY OF PROPERTY FORMS 
Some may argue that we need to accept or acknowledge new property 
forms to facilitate the creation of roaming rights as severable from property estates. 
Alternatively, a roaming market could be created by simply relying to facilitate 
roaming access on existing property forms (such as licenses and easements—
including time-limited ones) or on existing contract forms. While it is likely that a 
market would emerge using existing mechanisms—much like homesharing adapted 
existing mechanisms to accomplish its goals—this part will briefly explain why 
property law itself is suited to adapt to the roaming market even if it does end up 
requiring the creation of new property forms. In fact, the technological revolution 
being witnessed within the sharing economy seems a perfect test for understanding 
the capability of the property system to adapt and evolve. This evolution happens in 
a manner that preserves the core attributes of having a predictable and identifiable 
legal substructure with a shared and understandable vocabulary. 
In a market to roam, owners with the right to exclude could choose to (1) 
grant contracts that allow access for roaming, a category of rights for which owners 
have wide latitude within contracts law;155 (2) use existing property forms like 
licenses, easements, or leases to accomplish the creation of property-based or 
contract-plus-property hybrid rights to roam between owner-grantors and roamer-
grantees (or accomplish the same exchanges with platforms that thereafter would 
assign rights to actual roamers); or (3) give up a portion of their right to exclude by 
transferring a roaming right to others in the nature of some new property form that 
grants an inclusion stick carved out of the exclusion right. If the market to roam 
only utilizes existing contract or existing property forms, much of what is discussed 
in this Part is irrelevant. The idea of creating roaming contracts in categories (1) 
and (2) is less susceptible to criticism than the latter property right, which some 
might see as the creation of a new property form.156 
 
 155. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2000) (“A willing buyer and a willing seller can create 
an infinite variety of enforceable contracts for the exchange of recognized property rights, and can 
describe these property rights along a multitude of physical dimensions and prices.”). 
 156. See id. at 3 (“A central difference between contract and property concerns the freedom to 
‘customize’ legally enforceable interests” where “[t]he parties to a contract are free to be as whimsical 
or fanciful as they like” but property is more rigid.). 
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The creation of roaming rights that can be traded seems like a 
straightforward extension of the bundle of sticks concept of ownership,157 when 
property in a thing can be disaggregated into a variety of legal interests in the thing. 
But how far the bundle metaphor can be extended is a regular subject of debate.158 
Considerations over just how far property rights can evolve and adapt to 
accommodate new interests in splitting property into new, discrete customized 
interests are key concerns. 
By engaging with the literature on the connections between technological 
innovation and the feasibility for the property system to absorb the creation of new 
property forms, the argument for a “market to roam” as a feasible evolution in our 
appreciation of enforceable rights is strengthened. Despite the fact that a new 
property form is likely unnecessary, there could be a reason to identify a separate 
property interest in roaming—a process that could butt heads with arguments 
disfavoring the creation of new property forms. As those crafting a market to roam 
begin to get creative and innovate, new property forms might allow for greater 
customization of property relationships between owners and roamers or between 
owners and platforms. The benefits from long-term and durable commitments may 
counsel embracing new property forms as the vehicle for transferable roaming 
rights as a better means to generate stronger property-based relationships than what 
could be created through existing property forms or contracts. 
Thus, to give the architects of the new market to roam wide berth for 
navigating us toward a system that works most effectively, this part will focus on 
why, even if a new roaming right needed to be created and identified as a separate, 
new interest, it would not pose a threat to the stability of the system of property 
forms. In the process, the analysis also helps tell a story about how technology can 
facilitate the market to roam and aid the acquisition of information necessary for it 
to function well as a system of rights’ exchange. 
New technologies that manage trust problems like we see emerging in the 
sharing economy already should help spur easy, low transaction cost roaming 
rights. The question whether the system of property can accommodate such 
transactional arrangements requires some basic preliminary analysis. As previewed 
above, the rest of this part takes on that task. Although some scholars question the 
capability of the property system to support subdivision of rights, or sticks, in the 
property rights bundle, emerging technologies might be capable of breaking down 
barriers to new legal interests.159 New sharing economy mechanisms are 
demonstrating just how such technologies can make transactions in subdivided 
property bundles more accessible to owners and users of property160 and these 
 
 157. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 127-28 (explaining that the bundle of sticks means that 
“Particular rights—the right to harvest timber or to cross a particular piece of land—represent individual 
sticks; various rights holders have bundles of varying composition with respect to particular parcels of 
land.”). 
 158. Merrill & Smith, supra note 155, at 3 (explaining that fragmentation must be controlled to 
maintain optimal standardization of property rights, but that “[t]here is a spectrum of possible 
approaches to property rights, ranging from total freedom of customization on the one hand to complete 
regimentation on the other.”). 
 159. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 127-28. 
 160. See supra Part VI. 
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should be capable of extension, enabling technological facilitation of markets in 
ecological resources. 
Manipulating one’s package of property ownership rights to include others 
in its use and enjoyment requires a determination of the extent to which property 
rights are flexible and customizable. Consider the role of technology in the sharing 
economy and the way it has generated brand new ways to maximize the utility of 
property by putting to work underutilized assets in land and goods. New 
technology eliminates some of the concerns against newly customized forms of 
property, and the reason roaming rights could be recognized without offending the 
principles that work to cabin the universe of acceptable property forms. That this is 
an unthreatening prospect to the system of property standardization is revealed 
after examining the arguments against creating new forms of property. 
One of the arguments against customizable forms of property and the 
division of interests in property has been the fear that an unlimited set of diverse 
forms of ownership would be impractical to administer and enforce, with the 
market itself incapable of adequately understanding the division of rights in a way 
that could allow for efficient trading in them. For this reason, strong advocates of 
the numerus clausus principle—which holds that “property rights must conform to 
certain standardized forms” and the set of available forms is a closed, finite list 
limited to existing property forms thereby not permitting the creation of novel 
property forms outside the list161—advocate for a closed system that prohibits new 
entrants into the scheme of recognized property forms.162 Professors Thomas 
Merrill and Henry Smith explain why property forms are limited while contract 
forms are not.163 Unique problems can be generated when third parties must 
identify the meaning of novel forms in the property context in order to evaluate the 
nature of the property rights held.164 In contract law, third party reliance issues are 
less present.165 Merrill and Smith explain this information cost problem with 
property forms and conclude that its existence requires the property system to 
identify and work toward the optimal standardization (and limitation of the 
number) of forms in property law: 
The root of the difference, we suggest, stems from the in rem nature of 
property rights: When property rights are created, third parties must expend time 
and resources to determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid violating 
them and to acquire them from present holders. The existence of unusual property 
rights increases the cost of processing information about all property rights. Those 
creating or transferring idiosyncratic property rights cannot always be expected to 
take these increases in measurement costs fully into account, making them a true 
externality. Standardization of property rights reduces these measurement costs.166 
 
 161. Merrill & Smith, supra note 155, at 4. 
 162. Id. at 3 (explaining the purposes of a fixed set of enforceable property forms and that, 
“[g]enerally speaking, the law will enforce as property only those interests that conform to a limited 
number of standard forms.”). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 8. 
 165. Id. at 3, 8. 
 166. Id. at 8. 
Winter 2019 THE MARKET TO ROAM 121 
There are high information costs in translating the rights available in any 
particular property transaction and in understanding what rights others have in the 
piece of property one wishes to acquire.167 According to Merrill and Smith, the 
existence of high transaction costs associated with new and novel property forms 
necessitates that property law work with a closed set of optimal standard forms so 
that everyone engaging in property transactions is speaking the same language and 
capable of assessing the nature of each estate. To do otherwise, they contend, 
would inject indeterminacy in property forms in a manner that would impede trade 
in property.168 
Yet, even some of the strongest advocates for a closed set of property 
forms, like Merrill and Smith, nonetheless recognize that technological changes 
have the capacity to break down some of the objections to allowing new form 
entrants.169 Under Merrill and Smith’s “information-cost theory of the numerus 
clausus,” the availability of technology that provides “cheaper information” makes 
new property forms less objectionable.170 For example, they explain that the “strict 
formality requirements” normally required in negotiable instruments break down as 
technology improves: “when technology furnishes alternative means of promoting 
reliance (including lowering the need to measure risk), there is less need for the 
standardization provided for by the requirements of negotiability.”171 
The technology that can facilitate transactions recognizing distinct 
roaming rights, already proving itself in other aspects of the sharing economy, 
should diminish resistance from those that might worry about a market to roam 
expanding recognizable and enforceable property forms. As Merrill and Smith 
admit, “to the extent that technological change allows cheaper notice of relevant 
interests, the need for standardization by the law will be somewhat diminished,” 
and “technology that lowers information costs can be expected to weaken the 
numerus clausus” principle.172 If it can be done in a verifiable and identifiable way, 
then recognizing a new form of property right to roam as a separable, tradeable 
stick in an owner’s bundle of rights would not disrupt optimal standardization of 
forms. 
This conclusion is also consistent with the work of Professors Bruce 
Yandle and Andrew Morriss, who describe technology—whether it be in physical 
form like barbed wire or in legal innovations like land registries—as an accelerator 
of property rights evolution.173 Professors Terry Anderson and P.J. Hill reach 
 
 167. Id. at 40; see also Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 140 (“One important class of 
transaction costs relates to measuring and monitoring the items transferred among trading parties. Where 
the ability to define, defend, and therefore, monitor such transfers is lacking, alienability and gains from 
trade cannot be obtained, and contracts cannot be enforced.”). 
 168. Merrill & Smith, supra note 155, at 31. 
 169. Id. at 40 (“Our explanation of the numerus clausus generates some general predictions about the 
way in which property regimes will change over time: As the costs of standardization to the parties and 
the government shift, we expect the optimal degree of standardization to rise or fall.”). 
 170. Id. at 41-42. 
 171. Id. at 42. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 127 (describing the “technologies” affecting property 
rights in terms of physical world technologies (like barbed wire) and legal innovations (like recording 
statutes)). 
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similar conclusions, crediting the advent of new technologies as transforming the 
nature of property rights in the American West.174 
Changes in the physical, legal, technological, and social environment 
surrounding and impacting property ownership and usage have the capacity to alter 
our understanding of the optimal configuration of property rights.175 Quite simply, 
property rights can carry more customized operational baggage when technology 
lightens the load. Yandle and Morriss explain that, “The technology of property 
rights can be understood by thinking about this bundle of sticks. Technology, either 
in law or in a more conventional sense, allows increasingly sophisticated 
definitions of property rights and allocation of particular sticks to either private 
property owners or public entities.”176 They describe this inherent flexibility and 
adaptability in the property system as facilitating “unbundling” the rights within the 
property rights bundle of sticks in three ways: (1) “technology can affect what 
rights can be placed into the bundles of sticks. Thus a legal change or scientific 
innovation may place something within the category of things that may be owned 
or may remove it from that category;”177 (2) “technology can make it possible to 
subdivide property rights within a particular bundle in new ways;”178 and (3) 
“technology may make different forms of property possible.”179 All three of these 
unbundling mechanisms seem present in the creation of a market to roam as 
facilitated by platform technologies like those seen in already emerging sharing 
economy sectors. Consider how Yandle and Morriss describe the conditions for 
unbundling: 
Unbundling is a vital component of the process of property rights 
evolution. All of the paths out of the tragedy of the commons 
require creating and allocating some new stick or sticks in a 
property rights bundle. Although the paths differ in what they 
require to create and allocate a stick, each path involves some 
combination of defining, defending, and enabling transferability 
of property rights.180 
The technology that would be employed in sharing access would 
accomplish that definitional, supportive, and enabling work. 
The dynamic nature of property rights makes them adaptable to serve 
more and more functions, including social ones that might have seemed to some 
only possible if exclusion were limited by the state. And the “[c]hanges in property 
rights technology [that] can alter the mix of costs associated with defining, 
defending, and enabling transferability as well as the relative magnitudes of the 
 
 174. See generally Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the 
American West, 18 J. L. & ECON. 163, 164-65, 167, 172-75 (1975) (discussing technological innovations 
as one of the factors that “govern changes in the content of property rights,” with branding and barbed 
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 175. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 127. 
 176. Id. at 128. 
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 178. Id. at 129. 
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 180. Id. at 135. 
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various cost generators”181 can be seen in the new technologies capable of 
facilitating the creation of roaming rights tradeable in a market to roam. When the 
benefits increase and costs decrease for applying new technology, the incentive 
calculus changes for investing in activity. Individuals will expend more time and 
resources on innovative new ways to define and enforce property rights.182 
As earlier parts of this article illustrate, new technologies have emerged to 
make it possible to generate identifiable interests while creating the transparency 
and monitoring necessary to make exchanging roaming rights an efficient transfer 
and one that should receive legal acknowledgement and enforcement. The 
explanation by Yandle and Morriss about the conditions that should exist to 
recognize new property rights serves as a blueprint for the application of 
technology to the roaming rights market: 
Defining, defending, and gaining agreement involve three aspects 
of property rights technology. For any type of property right to 
exist, the resource itself must be identified and its amount and 
quality measured. To defend the defined rights to the resource, 
threats and harms must be identified and measured. For rationing 
and exchange to take place, resource activity must be monitored 
and recorded. These categories of technology can include basic 
scientific knowledge about the resource and threats to it, as well 
as meters, remote sensing and recording devices, fences, brands, 
and identifying marks. The third category, gaining agreement, 
generally involves the use of some kind of two-way 
communications technology that provides information, feedback, 
and recorded agreement or disagreement between and among 
people who would normally transact with each other.183 
The identification, measurement, monitoring, recording, and feedback 
requirements can all be met within a market to roam facilitated by platform 
technologies. 
If policymakers identify these functions of technology and construct 
roaming rights with each of those criteria in mind, and if the demand exists for 
roaming, a market to roam should be feasible whether we rely on an expansion of 
existing property forms to do the job or whether we use existing vehicles in 
contracts or property to facilitate the transfer of the appropriate rights. If new 
property forms are necessary, the disruption to the system will be minimal, if any, 
given the technological innovations that allow us identify, monitor, and track the 
discrete interests associated with the market-based right to roam. 
VIII. WHAT OPERATIONAL HURDLES MIGHT WE ANTICIPATE TO 
OVERCOME AS WE DESIGN ROAMING MARKETS? 
As we sketch out the contours of a possible market to roam, it is important 
to recognize some of the hurdles to its effective functioning and to be honest about 
 
 181. Id. at 139; see also Anderson & Hill, supra note 174, at 178 (“Technological change or lower 
resource prices will increase property rights activity.”). 
 182. Anderson & Hill, supra note 174, at 167, 178. 
 183. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 126, at 141. 
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some of its limitations that could make it less than satisfying to those who push for 
more roaming access. By acknowledging and cataloging these concerns, the hope is 
that market to roam entrepreneurs will start to innovate toward solutions to 
minimize their incidence or impact on achieving a robust roaming market. In 
providing some preliminary awareness of these problems, perhaps brainstorming 
will begin and solutions may follow. 
A good starting point is a list of concerns that Professor Neil Hamilton 
developed to examine what should be done with any expanded access system to 
incentivize private property owners to allow more public access to their lands.184 
As he explains: “The challenge is developing a mechanism to encourage private 
owners to open their lands for private use. One question to consider here is: What 
would it take for a private landowner to be willing to allow some forms of public 
use of a property?”185 Hamilton answers his question with a very useful list.186 
Several of the items on the list call for more governmental intervention than is 
advocated here. Others may prove useful where the hope is to sketch a roaming 
system that is minimally dependent on government coordination and more purely 
market-oriented. Additional issues not included on Hamilton’s list are also 
discussed below. 
A. Liability of Property Owners 
Property owners may be reluctant to engage in roaming transactions for 
fear of liability for injuries to roamers with whom they contract.187 One can 
imagine a situation where a roamer either is granted permission for free or for a fee, 
stumbles while roaming, and suffers bodily injury. The law will presumptively treat 
 
 184. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 202. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. Hamilton’s list of what must be provided in order to encourage property owners to offer 
more access: 
1. Protections from liability for anything that might happen to people while they are on the land, even if 
compensation is provided. 
2. An ability to be compensated if there were damages or other harm that happened, e.g., crops 
destroyed or fences damaged. 
3. Some assurance of adequate supervision or management with increased public safety patrols by the 
game warden, sheriff, or county conservation board. 
4. Clear designations as to which property is open for public use and which is not, such as through 
signage and other markings, and an indication of the types of activities allowed. 
5. A process for establishing well-understood limitations on the extent of public use—such as time and 
manner restrictions—e.g., permitting walking only on trails or closing land to public use during hunting 
season or calving. 
6. Forms of compensation to provide significant economic benefits or tax breaks for participating in the 
program. 
7. Some form of restriction or record-keeping so users can be identified and informed of the rules, 
permit fees can be collected, and user rights and obligations communicated. 
8. Some method of public recognition and acknowledgement for providing the public benefits. 
Id. 
 187. Id. at 201 (explaining that private landowners are “fearful of allowing any form of public use 
due to worries about liability if someone is injured”). 
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the roamer as a licensee or invitee and exposure to tort liability may follow.188 
Although the law sometimes makes owners liable also to trespassers, that liability 
risk is very low.189 When the relationship changes and the roamer is there by 
permission, the property owner may be forced to take on new duties that would not 
have existed but for that permission. Consequently, many owners may be deterred 
from agreeing to offer their properties in a market to roam because of this risk 
exposure, with potential liabilities likely far exceeding any fees they could charge. 
Alternatively, any fees that might be charged and adjusted upward to account for 
the liability risk might be too high to generate willing roaming customers. The risk 
could either drive out suppliers or drive up costs so high that demand is lost. 
The law has already attempted some solutions to have the best of both 
worlds—more owners permitting access while limiting the risk of liability. So-
called “recreational use statutes” adopted across the states provide a liability shield 
to property owners who allow strangers to recreate on their property.190 Every state 
has adopted some version of this kind of protective legislation to encourage owners 
to allow greater access.191 As the Alabama statute declares, for example: 
[I]t is in the public interest to encourage owners of land to make 
such areas available to the public for non-commercial purposes 
by limiting such owners’ liability towards persons entering 
thereon for such purposes [and] that such limitation on liability 
would encourage owners of land to allow non-commercial public 
recreational use of land which would not otherwise be open to 
the public.192 
 
 188. See, e.g., 48 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS § 275 (1987). The following summarizes the basic 
standards of tort liability for those who enter property with permission: “An invitee is one entering the 
premises on the landowner’s or occupier’s invitation. A licensee is uninvited, but enters with the 
owner’s or occupier’s permission or acquiescence . . . Under the traditional common-law approach . . . 
an invitee is owed a duty of ordinary care, but trespassers and licensees are obliged to take the premises 
as they find them, and the possessor of the land owes them only a duty of refraining from wanton and 
willful injury, insofar as the condition of the premises is concerned.” Id. 
 189. William Rooks & Caitlin Dorné, Torts, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 217, 219 (2014) (“[C]ourts 
generally hold that a landowner or occupier is under no duty to anticipate a trespasser’s presence. And 
where a landowner or occupier neither knows of the trespasser’s presence nor the danger, no duty arises 
to maintain the premises;” but, “a landowner or occupier may not lay a trap with the intent to harm 
trespassers.”). 
 190. Id. at 201 n.76 (“The fears relating to potential liability if users are injured have been addressed 
in the various recreational use laws passed in most states”); see also Kenlan, supra note 74, at 197 (“As 
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Royer, Jr., Protection for the Recreational Property Landowner: The Alabama Recreational Use 
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126 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 59 
The basic hope is that the recreational use statutes will motivate risk-
averse property owners to provide greater recreational access to the public over 
their private lands. Oftentimes, a state statute will expressly eliminate a duty of 
care in relation to a stranger’s recreational use. Maine, for example, provides that 
“[a]n owner . . . of premises does not have a duty of care to keep the premises safe 
for entry or use by others for recreational . . . activities or to give warning of any 
hazardous condition . . . to persons entering for those purposes.”193 
These statutory protections should be extended as far as possible to apply 
to permissions granted within a market to roam. Nonetheless, they may often be of 
little assistance to encouraging owners to engage in the permissions anticipated by 
this article’s proposal. In some states, for example, the protection of a recreational 
use statute focuses on whether a fee is charged for the permission or access related 
to the recreational use. Iowa’s statute, for instance, provides that a property owner 
“who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to 
use such property for recreational purposes or urban deer control does not . . . 
assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property 
caused by an act or omission of such persons.”194 This approach would obviously 
make these laws ineffective at solving the liability problems associated with a 
market to roam if that market (in whole or in part) relied on the possibility of fee-
based roaming rights.195 Because liability exposure in those circumstances would 
remain under many of the recreational use statutes presently operative, some 
broader legislative protection might be necessary to encourage more owners to 
allow roaming. Some states like Alabama, for example, allow owners to gain the 
protection of its recreational use liability shield even if the owners charge fees, so 
long as the fees are not for a profit.196 In such states, though, if one is permitting 
access for the purpose of making a profit then the statutory protection does not 
apply.197 
Given their limited scope, the existing recreational use statutes are ill-
equipped to foster fee-based sharing relationships for roaming access. They do not 
give enough property owners sufficient confidence that they will not face 
additional liabilities if they participate in a right to roam. 
Beyond statutory shields, other mechanisms might emerge and should be 
explored to handle the liability problem. Several mechanisms from the categories 
of contracts and insurance immediately come to mind. Contractual disclaimers of 
liability are a possibility, but they will be subject to the limitations on, and 
indeterminacy of, enforceability that always follow such provisions.198 Contracts 
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could require roamers themselves to carry insurance policies for their own roaming 
injuries (and, perhaps to also cover the roamers’ own liability for damages to the 
owners’ property while roaming). In other words, roamers might be required to buy 
insurance for injuries suffered while roaming or for the infliction of damages to 
properties on which they roam before suppliers would be willing to exchange with 
them in the roaming market. Whether this could prove a disincentive to purchase 
roaming rights will have to be seen and will largely depend on what insurance 
instruments are developed by the insurance industry in response to a new demand. 
Similarly, participating property owners could purchase insurance to cover their 
risks of liability to this new category of third parties on their properties. Here too, 
insurance companies’ capability to provide a low-cost vehicle for risk protection 
will play a role in the cost calculus. Finally, to the extent that the properties in the 
roaming market are managed by a platform, the platform could be the entity 
obtaining insurance, capitalizing on its market power, economies of scale, and 
greater risk spreading to drive down the cost of insurance, making it cheaper than if 
each property owner or roamer had to obtain insurance piecemeal. Much like 
Airbnb’s “Host Protection Insurance” program,199 the platforms running the 
roaming market could obtain insurance and then offer policies to the property 
owner roaming-hosts at affordable rates that provide adequate enough coverage to 
encourage host-owner participation. 
B. Adverse Possession, Prescriptive Easement, and Implied Dedication 
Issues 
Whenever strangers begin to traverse upon or use private lands, there is 
always a risk that their use or occupation could rise to a level of protected legal 
status—even without the property owners’ consent. For example, in all states, 
statutes provide that non-owners may “adversely possess” property in a manner 
that gives them rights to property if they meet certain elements of adverse, 
continuous, and uninterrupted occupation for multiple years.200 Although it is very 
difficult to meet the requirements to prove adverse possession and it is very easy 
for an owner to assert their rights during the statute of limitations to eject the 
trespasser (defeating the occupier’s claim to the continuous possession necessary to 
complete the elements of adverse possession), once an occupier meets the elements 
they get title to it as a matter of law and consequently the owner loses title.201 A 
similar doctrine recognized in all states involves “prescriptive easements.”202 With 
elements very similar to adverse possession, a “prescriptive easement” can be 
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established when someone uses the property of another adversely and continuously 
across a defined statutory period without permission or interruption from the owner 
of the fee over which the use is made.203 Courts recognize a few other types of 
implied dedications or implied easements as well, based on the behavior of the 
parties204—such as when a user of the property relies detrimentally on promises 
from the owner that the user may continue to use the property, permitting the user 
of the property to make a claim for an easement by estoppel.205 
To effectively incentivize property owners to allow roamers on their 
property, concerns over potential adverse possession, prescriptive easement, or 
implied dedication claims will need to be addressed.206 Such claims by roamers are 
likely to be defeated within a market to roam because of the documentation of 
permissive and limited use that would exist by the language of the roaming contract 
or other instrument conferring roaming rights. The elements of adversity or implied 
dedication can be overcome by looking to the purposes and permissions that gave 
rise to the presence of the roamer and the roaming activity, evidencing the absence 
of necessary elements under any of these doctrines. Nonetheless, it might be 
prudent to consider whether legislation declaring that any such roaming conducted 
within a market to roam shall not give rise to these claims—absent some 
extraordinary showing of defiance of an access agreement—should be adopted to 
ensure that owners are not chilled from entering the roaming-property supply chain 
by the perceived possibility of such claims.207 
C. Land Assembly Issues / Checkerboard Risks 
Participation in the right to roam needs to be extensive if it is to provide 
effective and attractive supply of access. It is likely that hikers and roamers will 
seldom want a path through only a single property. If they cannot assemble a rights 
package that allows them to complete a full roaming experience, they may be 
unwilling to purchase or subscribe to any roaming rights at all. This is often an 
argument presented to claim that only the government can manage an access 
regime.208 
The system needs to work on attracting property owners as participants to 
overcome the potential that multiple lands cannot be assembled to provide a 
valuable combined product. If there is not an uninterrupted path for roaming across 
 
 203. SINGER, supra note 117, § 5.4. 
 204. Id. at § 5.3. 
 205. Id. at § 5.3.1. 
 206. Kahr, supra note 33, at 90-91 (discussing the necessity of policies addressing adverse 
possession, prescriptive easement, and liability for injuries risks associated with allowing recreational 
use on private land if we are to incentivize private owners to grant access rights). 
 207. Id. at 81 (“Legal rules limiting adverse possession exposure, implied dedication findings, and 
liability for third-party accidents when a landowner allows public recreational use of private land 
introduce incentives for owners of unenclosed land to acquiesce to” public access (including for off-road 
vehicles)). 
 208. See, e.g., Hynes, supra note 32, at 978 (“[T]here are several possible market failures that could 
justify public action,” including “an anti-commons problem may prevent effective private sector action. 
For example, a hiking trail may need to cross several parcels, and each parcel may hold out and demand 
a payment equal to the entire value of the trail.”). 
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multiple contiguous parcels, the desirability of the rights will be diminished. 
Innovators should work to find ways to create integrated networks of property 
owners. The level of difficulty cannot be fully known until a spontaneously-ordered 
market is set loose and entrepreneurs start to innovate from the bottom up to find 
solutions to overcome these hurdles. As indicated earlier, private organizations 
have already shown success at cobbling together multiple access rights to create 
substantial trails for snowmobile and other access. Thus, it can be done. And, with 
proper organization, clarity of benefits, and outreach—especially if facilitated by 
platforms that have an interest in assembling large portfolios of access rights—
hopefully the risk that rights would only be available in disconnected squares on a 
checkerboard can be minimized. 
D. Transaction Costs Associated with Acquiring Rights from Multiple 
Owners and Identification of Participating Properties 
A related, but somewhat different, concern is that roamers may face 
prohibitively high transaction costs if they are required to negotiate with multiple 
owners to put together a roaming path across multiple properties. This is where the 
organizational and informational elements of platform providers can be brought to 
bear. Platforms can bring their proven skills to this coordination problem and keep 
transaction costs low, allowing roamers to use the platform as the intermediary. 
The platforms and the technology they generate should also find ways to maximize 
the information available to consumers in the roaming market to make the 
identification of participating properties easy—both in advance planning and while 
“in the field” when they might need to navigate around non-participating parties or 
engage in new transactions during, and in order to continue with, a roaming 
experience. 
E. Who sets the prices? 
The platforms could also serve as a way to standardize prices and to 
overcome perverse incentives for landowners to hold out (such as when wanting to 
be the last in a chain of properties necessary to assemble a full trail) or otherwise 
charge exorbitantly high prices. In fact, this may become an even more critical role 
for platforms than it is in something like Airbnb or Uber. Roaming is different 
because the roamer may need to patch together several distinct properties. That is 
not a problem for Airbnb, because people choose one property for the full 
experience (they are not changing lodging locations every hour). 
At the same time, however, there will need to be ways to account for 
variation in prices depending on the value of the experience offered from any 
particular property even while trying to avoid pricing behaviors by individual 
suppliers that inhibit the market’s success. With Uber, for example, the main thing 
the customer usually cares about is time (setting aside safety and the comfort level 
of the ride at the margin). But in the roaming market it is more likely that different 
properties might have different ecological amenities and other experience values 
that make the value of the roaming different on different properties. In that sense, 
the pricing might be handled more like Airbnb where different dwellings offer 
different value. 
130 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 59 
F. Compensation to Landowners for Damages 
Landowners may want easy vehicles for bringing claims against roamers 
for damages to the lands used. Contract provisions will likely accomplish most of 
the work here, but both the types of damages claims and the dispute resolution 
formats should be carefully examined as the market emerges. If landowners feel 
that damage to property will be frequent, that responsibility will be hard to assess, 
that dispute resolution will be costly, or that judgments will be difficult to collect, 
they may be reluctant to enter the market, especially if prices are not high enough 
to cover the risks. Here, as with personal injury liability, insurance markets could 
emerge to minimize some of the risks to the landowner of suffering uncompensated 
property damage and to minimize some of the risks of liability of the roamers to the 
landowners through property damages claims. Investigation should be made as to 
how insurance could become available and benefit both sides of the transaction. 
G. Public Safety and Crime Prevention 
Any permissive access regime introduces the risk that those gaining access 
might pose a public safety risk or use the access to further criminal purposes. If you 
let people inside the fence—proverbial or real—they are one less step removed 
from committing a criminal act to the residents or their property. The more frequent 
lawful presence of non-owners on land may also make it harder to identify who 
belongs and who does not. Local law enforcement officials should develop 
strategies to adapt to the changed circumstances from increased roaming activity. 
Property owners too should find ways to minimize their personal risk and assure 
their safety when strangers become a more frequent and proximate part of their 
daily experience. It is likely that some property owners may find these safety 
concerns too high a risk, leading some to choose not to offer their properties in the 
market to roam. Others will invest in new security measures to lower the risks and 
some will increase the price charged for roaming to make that costs of bearing the 
risk more tolerable. Platforms or local governments could also adapt to provide 
greater security in response to the emerging market and increased foot traffic across 
these private lands. 
H. Reliability of Cellular and Satellite Service 
Much of the success of the market to roam may depend on the reliability 
of mobile phone cellular and satellite service. If we presume that a roaming market 
may depend on “in the field” transactions, those would be hard to process if one 
cannot stay connected. Service will also be required for navigating through 
participating properties, for getting pinged when alerts are necessary (such as when 
traversing outside boundaries or into new properties), for emergency assistance, 
and for platforms and owners to monitor movements so that they can hold roamers 
responsible for any damages or deviations from permissions. This need for service 
may cause functional concerns, but also could be a participation deterrent. The 
possibility of unreliable service may make the experience in a roaming market less 
worthwhile meaning fewer might pursue it; and, owners may be less willing to 
participate when they realize that their monitoring abilities may be compromised 
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by service interruptions or dead zones. Such monitoring problems may also affect 
the availability of insurance. 
While some of these problems may be unavoidable, their recognition at 
least allows market participants to adjust accordingly. And, it creates a target for 
secondary attention where those interested in improving the roaming market may 
have an incentive to assist with improving the universality of cellular service. As 
the market to roam evolves, attention should be given to improvements in wireless 
networks, cell tower placements, and in smart phone capabilities to minimize some 
of these risks. 
I. Non-Universality or Other Interference with the Unbounded Connection 
to the Earth 
Finally, even if the market to roam results in increased access, it will 
never be universal access because it is not compelled. This approach will likely, at 
least at first, leave many progressive property scholars and other free movement 
advocates wanting. The purity of open access without bargaining—because all 
properties become part of the accessible lands portfolio and because it is an 
unbounded and more natural connection with the earth—may seem lost when 
individuals must engage in a market exchange for acquiring roaming rights. Even if 
many of the rights are free or at minimal cost, the mere necessity of the transaction 
can seem like an interruption in the freedom of the roam. Yet, if the advocates for 
mandatory roaming rights also recognize that they are unlikely to ever see a 
political environment that will permit such universal mandated access, perhaps 
those advocates would be willing to support the development of what, in their 
minds, might be a second best solution. Nevertheless, this Article does not pretend 
that its proposal for a market to roam will serve as a perfect substitute for all of the 
social and human values that some seek when they call for limits on exclusion and 
the corresponding mandated conferral of roaming rights. 
* * * 
The market to roam is an alternative means of supplying roaming rights 
that demands attention within the broader discussion on how to expand access 
rights to private lands. Before presuming market failure (as those who advocate for 
government-mandated roaming rights do), the values of emerging technologies and 
business innovations breaking down barriers are worthy considerations. 
IX. THE COMPARATIVE UTILITY OF THE MARKET TO ROAM 
OVER COERCED ACCESS 
After successful solutions lead to an operating roaming market, there are 
many reasons to believe that consensual roaming arrangements will lead to a 
superior roaming experience with better stewardship of ecological resources than 
with progressive property’s mandated “right to roam” statutes.209 There are reasons 
to believe that protected and accountable access is better than free and less-
monitorable access. A system for sharing roaming rights through bargaining would 
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create accountability that is lacking in free-roaming regimes. After all, who 
watches the roamers when the state is the one conferring the rights and the roamer 
need not take any steps to seek advance permission to roam?210 
Exclusion and the gatekeeping function are necessary to protect against 
damage to property. As posited by Shawn Regan (who has, as discussed earlier, 
been tracking innovative sharing economy approaches to natural resources access 
problems), markets for access are about finding ways to allow access without 
losing the benefits of control that allow owners to protect their property.211 As he 
explains, private control over access with facilitation of inclusion by technology 
becomes “about finding the right ways to contract with landowners to reduce the 
risks of allowing access” rather than being about owners trying to lock out 
others.212 
In countries with free roaming via mandated access, there is very little 
incentive to care for and to avoid exploiting the resources. The tragedy of the 
commons kicks in for any resource for which one did not have to pay, one did not 
have to bargain, and when the owner of the land has limited rights to expel 
wrongdoers. Claeys projects this possibility: 
A roamer wants to derive present enjoyment from crossing a particular 
plot of land. It can seem churlish for an analyst to point out that, once roamers have 
some right to enter land, they might not stick to the trails or stick to hiking. 
Furthermore, the concerns that trouble landowners—lack of security, risks of 
accident—are not certain to occur, and the resultant harms will take years to arise if 
they ever really occur.213 
Free roaming rights granted by the state but without any immediate owner 
policing them risks overuse, depletion, and abuse of resources and activities more 
difficult to monitor and control.214 
Regan explains that, “Landowners, like all property owners, need to have 
some control and protection against damages. The sharing economy can provide 
that.”215 Through GPS technology associated with the smart phones that were used 
to enter into the roaming agreement, for example, owners could track where and 
when a particular roamer was in an area.216 So, if a fire started, vandalism occurred, 
or ecological resources were otherwise damaged, the owner could track down the 
responsible party (such as by knowing when the fire started and who was there at 
the ignition point when it did). This could facilitate direct action against the roamer 
for damages, or, as is often useful in other parts of the sharing economy, the owner 
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has the ability to negatively affect the roamer’s reputation in the roaming 
community. The risk of a bad rating with its consequential effects (such as a low 
score that makes other owners refuse access) would serve as a deterrent against bad 
behavior while on another’s land. 
A free but mandated roaming regime has none of this. When individuals 
have an entitlement to roam granted by the state, their entry, ingress and egress are 
not tracked. The owner will not know who was on their property or when, so 
seeking damages would be futile. Moreover, the roamers will be unidentifiable 
nomads with little risk of reputational consequences for bad behavior, removing a 
key deterrent to poor stewardship while on the lands. The state will not have the 
resources to monitor or track behavior. Indeed, it may not even have the power to 
do so given that the activities will be on private land burdened by roaming rights. 
In contrast, private owners who exchange roaming rights will more often be on the 
property because they are occupying it or caring for it on a personalized level rather 
than a distant public manager, in proximity to the activity so more likely to observe 
behavior at a low cost, and, as stated before, they have an incentive to watch their 
land resource. 
In fact, landowners who engage in the roaming-sharing market have 
another incentive. The burdened-by-bargain landowner may have a new reason to 
preserve the resources that attract roamers—maintenance of the character of the 
ecological resources that attract these new trading partners in the first place. The 
roamer-customers may represent a profit stream that flows from transacting in 
roaming rights. If roamers like one’s property because of the beautiful landscape, 
owners will take seriously threats to that landscape and protect against them. Thus, 
by aligning the interests of the owner with the interests of the roamer, the owner’s 
sensitivity to the natural ecological resources will be heightened. 
X. CONCLUSION 
There are ecological resources in private property that can be shared by 
more than the owners of the property. But it is the preservation and extension of 
property rights that will generate the most efficient, fair, and effective sharing of 
those resources, not mandated controls that force access and inclusion.217 By 
preserving a property owner’s rights to manage the gates on her land, we give her 
the power and incentive to open those gates. The constantly improving technology 
facilitating exchanges in underutilized assets of land gives property owners the 
means to negotiate exchanges for opening the gates as well as ways to monitor and 
prevent harms to their land once the gates have been opened. 
We should not allow progressive property scholars to control the narrative 
that inclusion is only possible through coercion and that roaming rights can only 
emerge through mandates. That narrative is simply one that seeks to diminish the 
importance and chip away at the sanctity of the right to exclude in a system of 
private property rights. 
This article provides a challenge to those who would advocate for 
statutorily-compelled roaming rights. It forces a debate about whether market 
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mechanisms for roaming could accomplish some of the same goals but through 
better means more respectful of property rights traditions. Gates which expand 
access to ecological and other resources can be opened through consensual 
exchange. Embracing exclusion and encouraging technological innovation in land 
access exchange seems a far superior place to focus the roaming energy. 
